Democracy, Aesthetics, Individualism: Emerson as Public Intellectual

Abstract

Claims recent criticisms of Emerson’s political activism in the cause of abolition have focused on three linked failures: his élitism and his failure to become a representative of the American people; his association of ethics and aesthetics and his failure to find a more truly oppositional position; his commitment to a transcendent lawfulness to which both individuals and communities must submit and his failure to embrace more radical forms of liberation. Believes each of Emerson’s failures involves the overarching problem of his individualism, yet criticisms do not address the structural and historical appeals to individualism and to the individual’s judgment, allegiances, actions, and identity. Argues that by addressing these difficulties, critical discourse can move from attacking or defending Emerson to using him as a representative figure in developing and clarifying the intellectual’s dilemma. Claims this is an Emersonian distinction with implications for public intellectuals today.