Nietzsche and the Style of Non-Assertion: Skepticism, Fanaticism, and Hypothesis-Making

Abstract

Recently, there has been a growing interest in Nietzsche and ancient skepticism. In debates on Nietzsche’s reception of Pyrrhonian skepticism, it has been suggested that his mode of writing, especially his so-called “aphoristic” style, has significant points of kinship with the Pyrrhonian strategy of non-assertion. According to this suggestion, both Nietzsche and the Pyrrhonists, despite their different philosophical projects, similarly deploy a non-assertoric language to avoid and attack dogmatism, strategically adopting a plurality of voices and developing conflicting or even self-refuting arguments. Building on this suggestion, in this article I further explore Nietzsche’s non-assertoric style of writing in comparison, and in contrast, with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It is my contention that Nietzsche is only partly committed to a Pyrrhonian-inspired non-assertoric mode of speaking and writing to avoid and combat various forms of dogmatism, especially its most extreme expressions in fanaticism. However, I argue, unlike Pyrrhonian non-assertion, Nietzsche’s skeptical style permits—indeed, requires—hypothesis-making. At least starting from The Gay Science, Nietzsche favors a skepsis of experiments that is not reducible to Pyrrhonian skepticism—especially, to a philosophy of suspension of judgment and non-assertion. To voice his experimental skepsis, Nietzsche adopts a non-assertoric style of writing that not only works against dogmatism and fanaticism but also permits him to make daring philosophical hypotheses.