

John Stuart Mill in the Context of His Own Marginalia

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*I*t is extremely unusual in the case of a writer as well known and thoroughly documented as Victorian Britain's leading philosophical empiricist and liberal theorist, John Stuart Mill, to discover a substantial amount of new, unpublished work. However, that is precisely what is contained in the textual margins, endpapers, flyleaves, and title pages of Mill's private library, once housed at his residence in Blackheath, London and now conserved in the John Stuart Mill Collection at Somerville College, Oxford.¹ Donated without condition in 1905 by Miss Mary Taylor, Mill's stepdaughter's niece, at the behest of Liberal politician John Morley, these roughly 2000 books increased the fledgling college library's holdings by nearly one-third and, even after being unfortunately purged of duplicates and titles deemed unsuitable for young ladies, provided a rich intellectual context in philosophy, political economy, jurisprudence, Classics, history, and English and European literature for students otherwise barred from taking university degrees of using the university library. Recognition of the bequest's scholarly, as opposed to pedagogical, import did not come until the 1960s, when the University of Toronto Press began its landmark edition of *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* (33 volumes, 1963-1991). John Robson and his coeditors were meticulous in tracing annotations and textual variants, and many of the individual volumes in the Toronto edition include references to such matters as noted in "SC," the Somerville Collection of Mill's publications. In 1969, apprehending the unique archival importance of the Mill library, the College formally reassembled Mill's remaining books into a Special Collection with its own dedicated space and began the

lengthy process of physical conservation. The now-just-under 1700 books and 50 unbound offprints and pamphlets contain tens of thousands of original handwritten marks and annotations that, combined together, are at least equal in volume to Mill's longest published works, his still-referenced *System of Logic* (1843) or *Principles of Political Economy* (1848). Moreover, the genres represented within the marginalia are fascinatingly unfamiliar to readers accustomed to the measured rationality of Mill's public prose: unauthorized autobiography, undelivered correspondence, and unfiltered thoughts, all composed prior to and often apparently without the expectation of subsequent readers. These myriad handwritten verbal and nonverbal supplements to the printed texts provide a diverse, unique, and largely under-examined context for future research, not just about Mill and his circle (including his father, Utilitarian James Mill, as well as economic theorist and liberal MP David Ricardo), but also more broadly focused on period reading practices, bibliographical description, paleographical attribution, corpus analysis, literary aesthetics, and other topics.

Scholarly interest in Mill's marginalia has extended beyond editorial matters since the late 1960s, but has been, until recently, limited to those able to afford direct access to the primary materials. Edward Alexander's "Mill's Marginal Notes on Carlyle's 'Hudson's Statue'" in *English Language Notes* 7 (1969) first brought to light Mill's unvarnished reactions to Thomas Carlyle's mid-century diatribe against the memorialization of greed. Mill's annotations reveal his intellectual rift with his former friend even as they confirm his skepticism about the judgment of Britain's commercial class. Three years later, in "The J.S. Mill Marginalia in Robert Browning's *Pauline*: A History and Transcription," from *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 66 (1972), William Peterson and Fred Stanley asserted Mill's profound effect on then-fledgling poet Robert Browning's subsequent career on the basis of their shared annotations in Browning's *Pauline* (1833).² More recently, Frank Prochaska's "Mill and Emerson: Sense and Nonsense" in *History Today* 63 (2013) established, on the basis of hand-annotated volumes of Emerson's *Essays*, a previously unknown transatlantic connection between the two authors, thereby inviting a revision

to existing scholarship and revealing an acerbically humorous Mill quite at odds with his disinterested published persona.³ Prochaska's article served as a catalyst for renewed interest and investment in the collection, including an ongoing collaboration between Somerville and The University of Alabama dedicated to digitizing the marginalia. Under development since 2015, *Mill Marginalia Online* (millmarginalia.org) was launched in April 2018 and continues to be actively updated.⁴ The promise of digitization has sparked additional and more diverse forms of scholarship. Emma Annette Wilson and Mary Alexander have cited the project as a case study for interdisciplinary digital humanities collaboration in "When Metadata Becomes Outreach: Indexing, Describing, and Encoding for DH" for *dh+lib* (2016). Also writing from a librarian's perspective, Helen O'Neill has reexamined Mill's key early donations from his library at Blackheath to the London Library in "John Stuart Mill and the London Library: A Victorian Book Legacy Revealed," published in *Book History* 19 (2016). Finally, Albert Pionke's recent essay, "Influence as Palimpsest: Carlyle, Mill, Sterling," in the collection *Thomas Carlyle and the Idea of Influence* (2018), uses Mill's marginalia in John Sterling's posthumous *Essays and Tales* (1848) to reconstruct the dynamic social network to which the three erstwhile correspondents and collaborators belonged.

All of which only begins to suggest the contexts made available through the margins of Mill's personal library. Included in Somerville's collection are two copies, one in English and the other in German, of Mill's own attempt to establish a context for his life and work in the form of his *Autobiography* (1873). Likely added to the Blackheath archive by Helen Taylor, who made sure that Mill's desire for posthumous publication was satisfied, these copies contain the now-well-known accounts of Mill's "education which was unusual and remarkable [...] the successive phases of [a] mind which was always pressing forward [...] and] a desire to make acknowledgement of the debts which my intellectual and moral development owes to other persons" (CW 1:5). The first of these subjects—Mill's meticulous reconstruction of his intensive progression from Aesop and Xenophon at age three, through Herodotus, Thucydides, Hume, Gibbon,

Plato, Defoe, and others by age seven, followed by Caesar and Cicero, then Newton, Shakespeare, Aristotle, and many others, all in their original languages and all read by age twelve—is perhaps the most famous “fact” of his life, and this despite the hitherto rather scant evidence. However, material corroboration for this “unusual and remarkable” curriculum has literally just come online with the first set of marginal marks and annotations included in *Mill Marginalia Online*. In this essay, we shall explore the new context for Mill’s childhood education provided by the marginalia in his personal library. Without minimizing either the practical or the theoretical difficulties that attend any attempt such as this to extract meaningful knowledge from haphazard archival information, we shall perform a deep dive into a single well-marked book, Franco Burgersdijk’s *Institutionum Logicarum* (1637), in order to balance Mill’s rather smoothly understated memory of his learning against the extraordinary effort, anxiety, and occasional exasperation recorded by his precocious younger self.⁵



Marginalia provides unparalleled access to its creator’s immediate and often unguarded reactions at the moment of its writing, but this does not obviate the need for subsequent critical interpretation. Regarding the specific marks and annotations found in the Mill library, there are historical reasons to treat every individual example with a healthy dose of suspicion. Mill’s books sat on open shelves in the Somerville College Library for over six decades, during which many were evidently consulted by successive generations of students, fellows, and visitors. The presence of notations made in ballpoint pen and even felt tip marker, neither invented until well after Mill’s death, in items in the collection, testifies to the engagement of subsequent readers with individual volumes. Also, since every book published before 1836 overlaps with the life of Mill’s father, himself a meticulous note-taker, there is the distinct possibility that these earlier titles also record the elder Mill’s reflections on the text. Fortunately with respect to the former, as the dataset of recorded marginalia grows ever larger, some of the signs left by readers of the books after Mill have begun to appear perspicuously anomalous, whether because of the style of the marks

themselves, the force with which they were made on the page, or, when annotations are decipherable, the presence of anachronous references. In the case of Burgersdijk's *Institutionum Logicarum*, which belongs to the neo-Aristotelian textbook tradition, changes in the history of logic itself render it unlikely that users of Somerville's library would have devoted the time and effort required to translate its Latin account of pre-mathematical reasoning for the purposes of their own twentieth-century education. Marginalia potentially left behind by James Mill requires a different exclusionary calculus. Here, the extensive identification and transcription of the father's handwriting in Somerville's collection made by Canadian scholar Robert A. Fenn, who also transcribed four of James Mill's commonplace books, held in the London Library, provides an expert opinion against which to measure subsequent discoveries. Fenn's unpublished notes contain no references to Burgersdijk's book, and detailed comparison of the marks and annotations found within the *Institutionum Logicarum* to those left behind in other books attributed by Fenn to James Mill yield no obvious similarities. All of which is not to say that such problems of attribution can be completely resolved, but they can be productively managed to an extent that allows for interpretive hypotheses.

At the same time, readers of marginalia must also guard against manifesting the philosophical symptoms of what Jacques Derrida would finally diagnose as "archive fever" in his 1994 lecture of the same title. This "mal d'archive" is, itself, symptomatic of the larger disorder first described by Derrida in *Of Grammatology*, within whose terms "archive fever" indicates a willful ignorance of "the framework of the *instituted trace*, as the possibility common to all systems of signification," including that of marginalia (46). Much traditional archival work is grounded in what, following *Of Grammatology*, one might call the metaphysics of presence. Reading the private papers, or handling the personal possessions, or examining the manuscript drafts, or reassembling the virtual library of a significant figure from the past, one hopes to recover some otherwise unavailable facet of what they thought, how they lived, the manner in which they worked, the sources from whence they derived inspiration; in other

words, to gain an originary perspective on that person that will cause them to emerge from the mists of history to attain what Derrida refers to as a state of “present-past” (66). The language surrounding archival work reflects and helps to constitute this hermeneutic: scholars almost always employ definite in preference to indefinite articles to describe the intellectual work being accomplished; one talks of consulting *the* archive, not *an* archive, as if there were only one archival presence, subdivided perhaps across multiple loci but all partaking of the same logos. And yet, “if it all begins with the trace,” if the origin of the archival figure has always already been subject to the linguistic process of discriminating among possible differences, then the appearance of the trace in the archive “obliges us to think a past that can no longer be understood in the form of a modified presence” (61, 66). Thus, even if the author of handwritten marginalia can be reasonably identified, the intentions behind that marginalia and therefore the archival subject may remain, in a metaphysical and epistemological sense, ultimately inaccessible. As a representative of what Derrida denominates the “absolute past,” John Stuart Mill cannot necessarily “be summed up in the simplicity of the present” (66). The larger framework of context provided by this special issue allows one to defer, at least to an extent, such post-structuralist cautions about “self-occultation” and “immotivation” (47, 51); whether the presence of John Stuart Mill’s “empirical mark” in the margins of Burgersdijk’s *Institutionum Logicarum* further mitigates against the dangers of archive fever is a proposition we shall explore for the remainder of this essay (61).



Understanding the significance of Mill’s marginal marks and annotations in Burgersdijk’s *Institutionum Logicarum*, however, is predicated upon locating the seventeenth-century Dutch logician and his treatise in their own appropriate contexts. Franco Burgersdijk was born in De Lier in Holland on May 3, 1590, to parents Petrus and Catherine (van Meurs 340).⁶ Burgersdijk progressed through the Latin School at Amersfort (1604-1606) via the Delft gymnasium (high school, 1606-1610) before studying at the University of Leiden (1610-1614) and then becoming a

lecturer at the French Protestant Academy of Saumur from 1616 to 1619. In 1619 he returned to the University of Leiden, becoming Professor of Philosophy in 1620, a post which he held until his death on 19 February 1635. During his tenure, he would also become Professor of Physics in 1628 in an appointment indicative of his forward-thinking interest and investment in educational reform, as well as serving as rector of the University in 1629, 1630, and 1634 (Lohr 287).⁷

Burgersdijk was at the University of Leiden during a period of major educational reform in Holland, energized greatly by his predecessor, logician Bartholomaeus Keckermann, and Burgersdijk's own logic text was created largely to fulfil the promise of standardized nationwide approaches to teaching the subject known as the "art of arts." In September 1625 the government of the province of Holland published a set of education requirements for Latin schools in an early move towards a kind of national curriculum (Spies 79). As part of this drive to enhance educational standards and standardization, the University of Leiden produced a set of textbooks covering central disciplines in the *trivium* and *quadrivium*, and Burgersdijk was commissioned to write his logic textbooks (both the *Institutionum Logicarum* and the *Synopseos*) which were then prescribed reading at both the high school and university level (Otterspeer 327; White 27; Hotson 158). Burgersdijk's textbook became the standard not only in Dutch schools in the mid-seventeenth century but also at the University of Cambridge where, alongside the *Ermeneia Logica seu Explicatio tum per notas tum per exempla Synopseos Logicae Burgersdicianae* (Leiden: David van Lodesteyn, Severinus Matthaei, 1650) of his successor Adrian Heereboord, it was a "staple[] of undergraduate education" (Serjeantson 224). Indeed, Heereboord himself explains in the introduction to his *Ermeneia Logica* that he has used and instructed students to use Burgersdijk's authoritative textbook since his appointment at the University of Leiden in 1641 (Verbeek, 47).⁸ Beyond the context of formalized academia, as Theo Verbeek has observed, it seems that Burgersdijk's textbook continued to "fulfil[] a need [...] for in 1646 it was translated into Dutch" as the *Institutio Logica, dat is, reden-konstigh onderwys, be-ghreepen in two boeken* (Amsterdam: Gerrit Willemsz, 1646) (47).⁹

To establish his place within the hierarchy of logic textbooks, in his Preface Burgersdijk sets out different schools of logicians which neatly encapsulate the clash in the early modern period between traditional followers of Aristotle, reformers who followed Petrus Ramus and in reorienting and rearranging the teaching of this keystone discipline, and those advocating for a hybrid approach. Burgersdijk enumerates Augustus Hunnaeus, Fortunatus Crellius, Petrus Bertius, and Petrus Molineus (the theologian and educator better known by his French name of Pierre Du Moulin) among the Aristotelians, though as he notes, he could name many others (A6v). What this means in practice is that these logicians instructed student readers first to learn the descriptive components of logic (praedicaments, topics, and so on) through lengthy chapters and even lengthier examples, before moving on to learn some of the active functions and uses which could be applied to the fully-described world. This is a logic which prioritizes static description, and it stands in contrast to the active, agitating logic which Ramus and his fellow reformers presented as their textbooks introduced students first and foremost to the dynamic principles of cause and effect—in other words, Ramus and his followers prioritized what logic could *do* and *make happen* rather than what it could describe. One way of seeing these two approaches is to understand reforming logics as representing a desire for change beyond the world of the textbook. These were textbooks forged in the crucible of the Reformation, widely adopted in reformed countries and cultures and well-suited in their emphasis upon action to support the most dramatic of social changes. These were, chiefly, the textbooks which led the drive towards a vernacular pedagogy: Petrus Ramus' influential *Dialecticae Libri Duo* (Paris: 1543) was translated into his native French as *La Dialectique* in Paris in 1555, and a number of logicians in England followed in his footsteps, producing textbooks ostensibly for readers with “small Latin, and less Greek.” These textbooks were not reprinted or used with anything even faintly resembling the frequency of their Latin counterparts, but the drive to make learning available to all—and in so doing, to give more and more people the power to harness precisely the power of learning which Burgersdijk advocates in

his Dedication and Preface for the good of society (naturally, the disagreements about what that good might look like were as much at odds as the staunch Aristotelians and Ramists themselves).

Logic was the crown jewel of the *trivium*, providing instruction in the art of thinking and understanding to be augmented with persuasive communication skills courtesy of its subordinate rhetoric, and martialled into effective sentences by the third member of the triumvirate, grammar. All students at school and university in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries studied a kind of discursive logic quite unfamiliar today, but of pivotal importance in shaping the way in which these students would generate and formulate their thoughts, ideas, and arguments and put them into words in this time period. Studies abound of the influence of logic and its partners upon writers ranging from William Shakespeare and John Milton to Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jonson, Andrew Marvell, and more, as well as its impact upon literary theorists such as Philip Sidney, but the most important thing to understand is that it played a fundamental role in the analysis and structure of discourse in this period.¹⁰ Burgersdijk's text was first published in Leiden in 1634, and underwent numerous further editions both at home and also overseas. In Holland it was reprinted in both Leiden and Amsterdam until at least 1685, as well as being translated into Dutch. In England, the *Institutionum Logicarum* was first reprinted in Cambridge in 1637, and fast became a stalwart of undergraduate education, being reprinted again in Cambridge and London in 1644, 1647, 1651, 1660, 1666, 1668, and 1680 (Sgarbi 137; Hutton 35). Two English translations of the *Institutionum Logicarum* were produced in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the *Monitio Logica* in London in 1697, and *An Introduction to the Art of Logick* in London in 1701 "for the benefit of young scholars and others, who have not the opportunity of being instructed in the Latin tongue," and the significance of the vernacular arm of this project is discussed below as it relates to one of Mill's interests in the text (title page).

However, with the rise of empiricism, training in discursive logic began to become passé: by the time that Isaac Newton was an undergraduate at Cambridge in 1661, Buchwald and Feingold have argued, his "absorption

of scholastic material bears every sign of having been superficial” (Buchwald and Feingold 15). Burgersdijk’s logic, and all of its fellow textbooks, were at the very heart of that scholastic education and its reformed discursive successor. Newton’s Trinity Notebook may show that he read these kinds of texts, and arguments have been made for their wider-ranging influence upon his work, but fundamentally by the latter part of the seventeenth century these were fading into a bygone era.¹¹ By the eighteenth century, Burgersdijk’s logic had become a literary punchline: in 1728, Burgersdijk is engaged as an absurd opponent to John Locke in Alexander Pope’s *Dunciad*, acting as a symbol of a logic left in ruins in the wake of modernity. Likewise, whilst Lawrence Sterne almost certainly owned a copy of Burgersdijk’s textbook, in *Tristram Shandy* he remarks that Tristram’s father “had never in his whole life the least light or spark of subtlety struck into his mind by one single lecture upon Crakanthorp, Burgersdicius, or any Dutch logician or commentator” (though he had read them) (Sterne 1.XIX).¹² Eighteenth-century student readers were also deserting Burgersdijk: on October 26 of 1730 at Trinity College, Dublin, “An Elegy on the Death of Francis Burgersdicius, burnt in the College-Parks” was published by students as a cheeky reflection upon the turn which their curriculum was taking towards empiricism and the beginnings of recognizably modern academia. Burgersdijk’s “immortal fame” is celebrated (l. 2), but his loss is also amended by “Tea’s flowing Streams” and “growing Pyramids of Butter” (ll. 17-18). So we are left with a mystery: why, in the nineteenth century, was John Stuart Mill studying Burgersdijk’s *Institutionum Logicarum* as if his life depended upon it? The answer to this question lies, at least in part, in his marginalia, to which we turn now.

The copy of Burgersdijk’s *Institutionum Logicarum* held in Somerville’s John Stuart Mill Collection, published in Cambridge by Field, is a small volume designed to fit in a pocket, measuring 145mm high, 100mm wide, and 39mm thick. It contains two discrete titles—*Institutionum Logicarum*, published in 1660; and Adriaan Heereboord’s *Hermēneia Logica*, published in 1663—each of which contains an independently paginated preface and main text. The breakdown of pages within these two

titles is as follows: *Institutionum Logicarum*, 24 pages of prefatory material, 357 pages of main text; *Hermēneia Logica*, 6 pages of prefatory material, 311 pages of main text. With roughly three-quarters of the collection now surveyed for handwritten additions, one half of which have been photographed, and one quarter transcribed and uploaded, we can say with some confidence that the book contains the second largest number of individual examples of marginalia of any single volume. In all, 351 of its pages contain at least one mark or annotation, with 1568 total instances.¹³ By far the largest majority of these are the 834 specimens of underlining and the 576 recorded examples of marginal numbers.

According to the retrospective account provided in Mill's *Autobiography*, he likely encountered Burgersdijk's book at age twelve, when what we might think of as the general education portion of his childhood curriculum was succeeded by an intensive study of logic. It was at this point, he writes, that he began reading Aristotle's *Organon* and "the whole or parts of several of the Latin treatises on the scholastic logic" (CW 1:21). In Appendix B, "Mill's Early Reading, 1809-22," to volume one of Mill's *Collected Works*, editors John Robson and Jack Stillinger supply a detailed list of his childhood reading, broken down by year, according to "all the references from the major sources" (CW 1:551).¹⁴ Among the several treatises they list Petri Burgersdijk, *Institutionum logicarum libri duo*, which remains otherwise unnamed in the text of the *Autobiography* itself.¹⁵ Why Mill chose not to specify a book the mastery of which obviously cost him an extraordinary amount of intellectual labor is beyond our ability to speculate; however, a small number of handwritten additions to the printed text do suggest an emotional context for his original reading.

Scattered throughout Burgersdijk's opening half of the shared volume are several marks that, while they may serve a placeholder function, definitely rise beyond the needs of utility to do so. Taken in order, these include a small musical note which appears at the beginning of a chapter (99); an interlinear triangle reinforcing the terminal punctuation of the preceding sentence (143); a doodle resembling three attached parallelograms that marks the end of the intermediate section of an individual chapter (147); a

fan-like flare which extends the printed horizontal line that separates two chapters (170); and a set of closely drawn vertical lines of irregular length that appears in the white space at the conclusion of the main text of the volume's first title (357). Whether these should simply be classified as expressions of a wearied adolescent attention span or subtle signs of instructional frustration or even imaginative rebellion, they do provide a unique form of material in-the-moment corroboration for Mill's otherwise retrospective descriptions of his early reading.

The measure of Mill's long-term intellectual investment in Burgersdijk's *Institutionum Logicarum* becomes most perspicuous in the hundreds of marginal numbers. In contrast to the above marks, as well as every instance of underlining—which were all written in pencil—these numbers were added in pen. Based upon the examples of marginalia found repeatedly elsewhere in Mill's library, this change in writing implement suggests that Mill returned to the book after he had finished his initial reading to provide a second, more polished set of mnemonic aids. For instance, such palimpsestic additions are evident in Emerson's *Essays*, the rewritten title page of which features a creative compilation of Mill's more ephemeral expressions of disapprobation, and in Alexis de Tocqueville's *De la démocratie en Amérique* (1835-40), wherein summative judgments are sometimes recorded in Mill's more readable fair-copy hand at the end of chapters or on the back flyleaves of individual volumes already annotated in his note-taking scrawl.¹⁶ Burgersdijk's book is not mentioned in Mill's adult letters—during the period in which he wrote his *System of Logic* (1843), for instance—leading us to suspect that he added the marginal numbers while still in his formative years, and, given their function, to which we shall return shortly, likely in close temporal proximity to his original reading.

Recorded according to the metadata conventions of *Mill Marginalia Online*, there are 576 examples of neatly handwritten numerals. Some of these examples contain multiple numbers separated by periods, however; when these numerical chains are broken into their constituent links, the total quantity of marginal numbers increases to 611. These can be found in three

of the four independently numbered sections of *Institutionum Logicarum*: 21 in the first set of prefatory pages; 251 in Burgersdijk's main text; and 339 in the main text of Heereboord. The numbers appear in two forms, with and without a decimal tenth added (i.e., 19 and 19.1).¹⁷ Since when multiple individual numbers appear together in the same annotation they are also separated by periods, this convention only added to the marginalia's initial inscrutability.

Ultimately, the context provided retrospectively by Mill in his *Autobiography* allows one to decode the function of these marginal numbers. Several pages prior to his nonspecific allusion to "Latin treatises," Mill recounts the "peculiar care" with which he was made to study Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at age ten or eleven (CW 1:15). Privileged by James Mill "as the first expressly scientific treatise on any moral or psychological subject which I had read, and containing many of the best observations of the ancients on human nature and life," the young John Stuart was required to "throw the matter of it into synoptic tables" (CW 1:15). A combination of a subject index and a spreadsheet, a synoptic table allows one to organize and recall information quickly and, when documented by page references, to locate that information in the original textual source. During the slightly later period during which Mill presumably read *Institutionum Logicarum*, he was both teaching his younger siblings and taking afternoon walks with his father; during the latter, he was responsible for "giving each day . . . a minute account of what I had read, and answering . . . numerous and searching questions" (CW 1:21). For both activities, a thorough knowledge of the book in question would be desirable, especially if one hoped to avoid "incurring [James Mill's] displeasure by my inability to solve difficult problems for which he did not see that I had not the necessary previous knowledge" (CW 1:15).

The function of the more than 600 handwritten numbers in Burgersdijk's *Institutionum Logicarum* appears to be to attain such synoptic expertise through a system of marginal cross-references. Just under 95% (580 of 611) of all numerical annotations in the book lead one to corresponding annotations on the pages referenced by the original numbers.

Numbers with a decimal tenth added to them lead one to pages in the other, independently paginated portion of the main text. Thus, page 15 of part one, authored by Burgersdijk, includes, from top to bottom, the handwritten numbers 11, 71, 7, 66, 117, 22.1, 18, 43, 12.1, and 24.1; similarly, pages 11, 7, 66, 117, 18, and 43 of part one contain a handwritten “15” in the margin, whereas pages 22, 12, and 24 of part two, authored by Heereboord, all feature “15.1”; moreover, each of the pages referred to by page 15 also contains additional numbers that, on the basis of other subjects, lead one to further pages.

The majority of numbers that do not precisely fit this pattern of marginal cross-reference—21 of the 31 numbers for which there are no apparent corresponding pairs—appears in the prefatory pages of Burgersdijk’s half of the volume.¹⁸ Within these opening pages, Mill’s marginal numbers function in two ways: 1) they provide page numbers, odd numbers only, in the top corner of pages that are otherwise only identified by their section headings (i.e., “Dedicatio” or “Præfatio ad Lectorem”); 2) they allow for marginal cross references between these now-numbered early pages. Thus, sheet A4r of the Dedicatio contains a “5” written in the top outside corner, indicating that it is the fifth printed page of the book, and a “10” in the outside margin, guiding the reader to A6v of the Præfatio ad Lectorem, which is the tenth printed page of *Institutionum Logicarum*, which has been left unnumbered because it is an odd-numbered page, and which contains a “5” in the outside margin of the printed text. In this case, there is a similar exhortation on both pages in favor of a sound logical education as the basis for the correct and upright running of a nation.

Elsewhere in these opening pages Mill appears drawn to Burgersdijk’s hierarchical classification of logicians into a “first,” “second,” and “third” class, as well as other ways of structuring learning within the “art of arts” as Burgersdijk and his cohort at Leiden would have it. Burgersdijk identifies Ramus as taking logic out of the realm of Aristotle and into that of Cicero, rhetoricizing it and earning himself the label of the “leader” of the “second class” of logicians. This hierarchical distinction caught Mill’s pen, and he draws a cross reference between A8r of the Preface (his hand-labelled page

13) and A6v (his page 10) of the same in which we learnt about the first class logicians and followers of Aristotle. On his page 15 of the Preface (B1r), Mill makes a third marginal annotation to indicate Burgersdijk's discussion of a third class of logician led by his predecessor at Leiden, Bartholomaeus Keckermann, who combined the precepts of Aristotle with the orderly principles of method and use professed by Ramus to form a new hybrid textbook. Mill's annotations in these opening sections display an interest in the hierarchy of logical education that Burgersdijk sets forth as he makes the implicit case that the synthesis of the best of these tactics as presented in the *Institutionum Logicarum* is the way of the future. Mill makes an earlier cross reference foreshadowing this discussion in the Dedication when he notes a link between Burgersdijk's description of his own two-book logic predicated upon precepts and practice and Mill's page 12 (A7v) of the Preface in which Burgersdijk discusses the roles of various different components of Aristotelian logic (Analytics, Categories, post-predicaments, and so on).

Constructing this dense network of marginal numbers was, undoubtedly, an enormous amount of work, enough, perhaps, to explain the expressions of relief at completing the various reading milestones marked on pages 99, 143, 147, 170, and 357. It is also work that would need to be done while the book was fresh in one's mind, perhaps with the aid of now-lost handwritten notes, as the range of cross-references spans the entire volume, in 80 instances pointing out corresponding passages in the separate treatises written by Burgersdijk and Heereboord, respectively. Whenever the numbers were penned—and this is a chronological detail that we are likely never to be able to pinpoint—they were a significant addition to a text already crowded with evidence for Mill's close engagement and sustained dialogue.

The defining features of early modern logics—the features that identify which school of thought they adhered to (Aristotelian, Ramist, hybrid, etc), and beyond that which sub-species of that particular branch of logic they espoused or founded—were their structures (the number of books into which they divided their texts, and the order of their chapters), and their lexis

(identifiable clusters of logicians adopt distinctive terminology to discuss central functions of logic). To examine Mill's relationship with Burgersdijk in close up, we will look at his marginal annotations at two important junctures from these defining textual components: Burgersdijk's definition of logic, and then his chapters on Cause and the specific lexis which he uses to describe this. Burgersdijk's chapters work by opening with a theorem about a particular part of logic and then using a numbered list of axioms to expound on that theorem by way of sometimes extensive commentary, so we will consider both components when looking at Mill's annotation of these central ideas.

Almost all logics in the early modern period start with a definition of their subject, making it important to see how both Burgersdijk set forth his idea and how Mill responded to that in his annotations. In chapter one, "De Logicae Natura, ac Divisione," or "Of the Nature and Division of Logic," Burgersdijk states that "Logica est ars conficiens instrumenta, iisque intellectum dirigens in cognitione rerum," evocatively translated by the anonymous English text of 1697 as "Logick is the Art of making of Instruments, and therewith directing the understanding in the Knowledge of Things" (*Institutionum* 1; *Monitio* 1).¹⁹ Beneath this definition, Burgersdijk explains that logic derives from the Greek *λογος* meaning "word" or "reason" (the latter being the dominant sense in operation here), and Mill's first engagement with the main text of his book begins when he underlines Burgersdijk's elaboration that, according to Aristotle, *λογος* is twofold, internal and external. His interest in these two phases of logic and its operations is fully manifest in his later interactions with Burgersdijk's chapters on cause and its varieties, so this opening marginal gambit indicates a longer-term interest in and commitment to exploring and understanding ideas of duality in the text.

Throughout his reading, Mill remains focused on analyzing the different roles that logic can play, underlining Burgersdijk's statement that "Logica dicitur alio nomine Dialectica... hoc est, *a disserendo*." or, "logic is also called by the name of Dialectic... that is, of disputing" (*Institutionum* 2). Although Burgersdijk does not acknowledge it explicitly, this definition

is that which Petrus Ramus and many of his sixteenth-century followers gave to logic. It is a definition which suggests as part of logic's discursive remit its argumentative role, but by the seventeenth century, "Dialectic" was falling out of vogue to be largely replaced by "Logic" at least in terms of the overarching name given to this discipline. John Milton, for instance, devotes a section of his logic text, the *Artis Plenior Logicae*, to explaining why logic is a superior term as its root word gives it the meaning of "*bene ratiocinandi*" or "reasoning well", whereas "dialectic" comes from the Greek διαλέγεσθαι which is "artem potius interrogandi & respondendi, i.e. disputandi significet," or, "the art of questioning and answering, i.e. it means debating" (1-2). Milton and Burgersdijk make the same argument in favour of the term "logic," and Mill's annotating pen provides him with a quick point of reference as to the principal distinctions being made about the name and function of this subject. He continues this approach later in the chapter to underline the four instruments of logic, definition, division, syllogism, and method; after all, we were told in the opening theorem that logic is the art of *making* instruments, so his follow up marks indicating what these are makes a lot of sense (4). This is what he came for.

Mill uses another distinctive type of marginalia in this opening section of the text as he reads that the genus of logic is an "*artem*," an "art" founded on intellectual habits (*Institutionum* 3). Mill uses curled brackets popularly associated with Ramism (although in practice also embraced by Aristotelians) to indicate a cross-reference to Burgersdijk's swift definition of "habit" as a kind of logical "quality" on page 23, where he states that it relates to the operation of the faculties.²⁰ The brackets enable Mill to indicate a little more precisely which section of the page he is relating to the later statement on "habit," and again this annotation reads as Mill following up on Burgersdijk's opening gambit. Burgersdijk states that logic is founded upon exercise and practice; here in his body text he explains what that means on page 3, and then on page 23 he elaborates on that position by explaining what a habit consists of, and all the way through, Mill's pen follows his argument, making explicit its ligatures through marginal cross references. It is perhaps also of little surprise that someone as famously, thoroughly, and systematically

educated as Mill, forced into rigorous intellectual habit from birth, would be interested in Burgersdijk's remarks on this, reinforcing as they do those of his father, James Mill. Perhaps Burgersdijk's systematicity is part of the reason that this textbook remained in Mill's curriculum long after it had departed mainstream education.

Now that we have a sense of Mill's initial dialogue with his textbook, let us turn to a series of chapters that was at the centre of the debate between Aristotelians and Ramists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: those on cause. In chapter 15 Burgersdijk introduces cause and its types, stating first that "Causa est, cujus vi res est," or, "cause is that by force of which a thing is" (*Institutionum* 55). Cause is the wind beneath the wings of all logical actions: it is the thing which gives life to everything, imbuing it with agency and purpose, and driving all activities. Made up of four parts, efficient, matter, form, and end, cause quite literally constitutes the world, making everything think and act as it does. Ramists heralded this potent force by putting cause in the very first chapters of their textbooks: here we are, logicians of action, whereas Aristotelians maintained their classical predecessor's system of logic whereby students first learn to describe the world in a static fashion through description, definition, praedicaments, and so forth, and only then are equipped with the moving parts of logic, cause, to be able to make these static objects *do* something.²¹ Burgersdijk's textbook fundamentally espouses Aristotelianism, but his lengthy and detailed treatment of cause speaks to the reforming bent that we can see at work in his prefatory materials and in his choice of terminology.

Mill again approaches this key part of Burgersdijk's text with an eye on identifying and distinguishing the definitions which it provides for technical terms. On page 56 as Burgersdijk writes on the subject of different types of cause (matter, form, efficient, and end), Mill underlines and makes cross references to pages 61 and 69 defining these. However, his practice here is slightly different to that which he was using in the first chapter to make the connection between its emphasis on "habit" and the later chapter on "Quality," which provides a simple, efficient definition of that function. Here, Mill's cross-reference to page 69 is focused on a particular component

of Burgersdijk's discussion of the efficient cause: the proegumenic or internal cause ("causa proegumene"). In this instance, Mill is making a connection which emphasizes a very particular lexis adopted by Burgersdijk, and more than a cross-reference to a simple definition this represents a cross-reference to a more elaborate and complex set of conceptions of this fundamental logical operation. In so doing, it represents another facet of Mill's strategies in his marginal annotations.

On page 69, Burgersdijk stipulates that "causa proegumena quae causam principalem intus dispone, vel etiam proritat ad agendum," or, in the anonymous English translation of 1697, "the Proegumenal, which inwardly disposes, or also excites the principal Cause to Action" (*Monitio* 63). The internal cause is pitted against its equal but opposite force, the procatactic or external cause. The external cause is something outside the actor or object which "moves or excites" it to action, illustrated by the vividly proselytizing example of the "Meritorius Cause... which moves the Agent to a Requital, and that either in good or evil things," which perhaps speaks to Burgersdijk's immersion in the religious controversies of his day, and which Mill underlined not out of an interest in the question of good or evil but to highlight the idea of moving someone to a requital.

Conversely, the proegumenic or internal cause "consists in the principal Cause it self" (*Monitio* 64). Burgersdijk provides a detailed example of this type of efficient cause making explicit its moral dimension, and on page 70 of his copy, Mill underlined this, giving attention to the actors and causal forces involved. Here is the Latin which he read, and his underlining indicated:

Siquis de nocte obambulans, multas res pretiosas observet
in apertis inimici sui aedibus, a quo jam antea injuriam
acceperat, negligenter custodiri, easque alio instigante
diripiat; causa objectiva hujus furti erunt ipsae res pretiosae
furis avaritiam irritantes; occasio, noctis tenebrae, et
patentes aedes, quae nonnihil furis propositum adjuvant;
autor sive causa moralis, qui instigavit; causa meritoria est
accepta injuria, ob quam pronior est furis animus ad

furandum. Causa proegumena est propria furis avaritia.
Caeterum autor sive causa moralis locum habeat
solummodo in causis voluntariis; objectum, occasion,
causa meritoria et proegumena etiam in aliis....

The 1697 translation follows the text closely thus:

If any one walking about in the Night should see many
precious things in the open House of his Enemy, from
whom just before he had receiv'd an Injury, to be
negligently kept, and at the Instigation of another should
take them away. The objective Cause of this would be the
Precious Things themselves, exciting the Covetousness of
the Thief; the Occasion, the Darkness of the Night and open
House, which in no little Measure further him in his
Purpose; the Author or Moral Cause, he who instigated
him; the Meritorious, the Injury received, for which the
Thief comes to be more prone to steal: The Proegumenal
Cause is the proper Avarice of the Thief. Farthermore,
Author or Cause Moral, has Place only in voluntary
Causes. Object, Occasion, Meritorious and Proegumenal,
also in others (*Monitio* 64).

Mill underlines the premise of the example as his unknown causal actor
prowls the night: the precious things in the actor's enemy's house do not
catch the attention of his pen, but he does underline the fact that the actor
had received an injury from his enemy and that the precious things were
being "negligently kept." Thus, Mill correctly anticipates the causal
dynamics at work as the example is established, because in the explicatory
sentences that follow, the injury received is identified as the "Meritorious"
cause making the thief more susceptible to steal, and the negligently open
house provides the cause of "Occasion" enabling him to act upon that
inclination. Mill does not underline the reasoning processes provided by
Burgersdijk to explain these causal functions, but he does underline the type
of cause referred to as "occasion," either to learn that concept or to bask in
the satisfaction of his own correct answer.

When Burgersdijk continues to expound upon the role of the proegumenic cause, Mill captures the key concept that this can act upon "only the principal Cause," as well as its alternative function as something which can "move[]" or "spur[]" that on:

...Causa proegumena, vel disponit causam principalem solummodo; veluti cum temperamentum corporis dicitur causa morum: vel etiam proritat; veluti cum ira est causa vindictae aut avaritia, furti (*Institutionum* 70).

...The Proegumenal either disposes only the principal Cause; as when the Temperament of the Body is said to be the Cause of Manners; or, also, moves it and spurs it on: As when Anger is said to be the Cause of Revenge, or Avarice of Theft (*Monitio* 64).

In underlining this second function, Mill highlights not the capacity to move (which is, after all, implicit in the idea of a cause itself), but rather the two specific instances from our example. First he underlines the result of causal action, "vindicate" or "Revenge," and then the cause of theft, "avaritia" or "Avarice," in accordance with his initial line of thought in his annotation of the initial premise, forming a neat suture in his reading process.

Whilst cause was an important function for Aristotelian, Ramist, and hybrid logic textbooks, it was more prominently featured within reformed texts, and Burgersdijk's treatment reveals his membership in a specific fellowship of logicians who espoused the specific terms "proegumenic" and "procatartic" to refer to internal and external cause. The first of these was Burgersdijk's predecessor Bartholomaeus Keckermann who introduced these terms to logic manuals in 1600 in his *Systema Logicae*. Keckermann was the father of the intellectual reformation underway in Holland in the late sixteenth century, and whilst he died before seeing his vision for an overarching curriculum come to fruition, his textbook, which combined the precepts of Aristotle and Ramus in an innovative hybrid, formed the basis for Burgersdijk's logic (White 27; Verbeek 47). The terminology which Keckermann introduced was adopted by a series of scholars in Holland including Burgersdijk, Christopher Scheibler whilst he was a professor at

the University of Giessen, and Gerard de Vries of Utrecht who used these terms as late as 1684, long after this kind of logic was *de rigueur*, in his *Logica Compendiosa* created for law students (incidentally, his example of a procataretic cause involves homicide, so between that and Burgersdijk's internally-inspired thief, causal education is a risky place to explore).²² However, Keckermann's terms also have an interesting English heritage: they made their English vernacular debut in radical Republican and Protestant Zachary Coke's *Art of Logick* of 1654, whilst they found their way into Latin courtesy of Coke's fellow Republican and much more lauded contemporary—none other than John Milton, who used these terms in his own Ramist logic textbook, the *Artis Plenior Logicae* written in the 1640s and published in 1672. These texts represent something of a rogue's gallery of logicians, each bent on reform although, as per Burgersdijk's introductory remarks, not necessarily imagining that reform as taking anything resembling the same direction, and Mill's observation of this very specific view of logical cause and its lexis aligns with his focus in the prefatory materials on the differing aims and achievements of the competing schools of logic which Burgersdijk conjures and aims to synthesize.

Considered as a corpus—which, constrained by space requirements, we have had to examine selectively and synecdochally—and related back to the autobiographical context with which we began, the marginalia found within *Institutionum Logicarum* speaks eloquently of how the talented and anxious boy sought to cope with “the chilling sensation of being under the critical eye” of James Mill, remembered by his son as “one of the most impatient of men” (CW 1:17, 1:9). That Burgersdijk is not mentioned by name in the *Autobiography*, and that Heereboord is not present even in the retrospective reconstruction of “Mill's Early Reading, 1809-22” from all major sources, despite their shared volume serving as the occasion for such worried labor, suggests both the suppressions required for even posthumous publication and the inevitable absences that remain even after unfettered access to Mill's archive.

Which is to say that there is still a great deal to be gained by further study of the marginalia found in Mill's books. Within the conjoined volume

of *Institutionum Logicarum* itself, for instance, one might productively compare the detailed marks in Burgersdijk's opening half, discussed above, with the equally voluminous amount of material in Heereboord's closing half. Perhaps best known for treating drinking as a competitive sport, in his intellectual predilections Heereboord embraced Cartesian philosophy, but his work and in particular his logic text and his teachings were based on and indebted to Burgersdijk's more traditional approaches; a comparative survey of Mill's engagement with both texts would help to gauge the extent to which he saw common ground between them, and whether it was that or their differences which led him to add the eighty numerical cross-references, as well as the hundreds of examples of underlining.

Dilating outward only slightly, from Burgersdijk and Heereboord to their intellectual contemporaries, one might begin to reconstruct a possible early-modern logical context for Mill's own *System of Logic* and his later *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (1865). In England, Burgersdijk's predecessor Keckermann's text was first adopted and widely promoted by Robert Sanderson; among the books in Mill's library is an annotated copy of the 1618 second edition of Sanderson's *Logicae Artis Compendium*. W. R. De Jong has argued for the influence of early modern Jesuit logician Phillipe Du Trieu's influence upon Mill in his discussions of logical terms, and present and fully digitized is Mill's annotated copy of Du Trieu's *Manuductio ad logicam* (1618) which would allow us to probe that argument from the perspective of the history of the book and the history of reading (De Jong 19-27). More recently, in discussing Mill's sources for his theories of ratiocination and induction in his *System of Logic*, Steffen Ducheyne and John P. McCaskey gesture to his knowledge of renaissance logic, and relate this to his reading of the *Elements of Logic* by Richard Whately, a key figure in reviving interest in Aristotelian logic in the nineteenth century (Ducheyne and McCaskey 63-82, footnote 18). Mill wrote an article on Whately's logic textbook for the *Westminster Review* in January 1828, and fully digitized and available in *Mill Marginalia Online* are Mill's annotated copies of the first and ninth editions of Whately's logic and also Mill's annotated copy of the companion volume, the *Elements of*

Rhetoric. The sum of these holdings proffers new insight into Mill's relationship with Aristotelianism in both its renaissance and its nineteenth-century forms and contexts. A comparative study of Mill's interactions with these texts through his extensive marginalia would be fruitful in providing a way of understanding how and why Mill was reading pedagogical texts which most would have agreed had passed their sell-by date well over a century before he began work on his own empiricist reformation of modern logic or his demolition of his contemporaries' excessive reliance on metaphysics.

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Notes

¹ We are grateful to the Somerville Library staff, especially Dr. Anne Manuel and Matthew Roper, for their assistance in preparing this article and for granting permission to us to cite unpublished handwritten additions to the John Stuart Mill Collection.

² The MS of this dually-annotated draft of *Pauline* is held in the Victoria and Albert Museum's Forster collection and was first the subject of a brief 1901 article in *The Dial* by Anna B. McMahan.

³ In the 1980s, Canadian scholar Robert A. Fenn also visited Somerville's John Stuart Mill Library Collection with the intention of recording and transcribing all marginalia produced by James Mill. Fenn's unpublished notes, which are extensive but not exhaustive, remain in the college's possession.

⁴ As did the publication of Prochaska's article, the launch of *Mill Marginalia Online* garnered international media attention, including articles from *Artwave*, *BBC Online*, *The Conversation*, *Daily Nous*, the *Guardian*, *Poets and Writers*, and *The Victorian Web*.

⁵ Although the contents of Mill's copy of this book are more variegated than this singular title suggests—about which more below—for ease of reading and in keeping with the cataloguing conventions in use at Somerville, we have opted to refer to its author simply as Burgersdijk and its title as *Institutionum Logicarum*.

⁶ Burgersdijk's maternal uncle was Hugo Blotius, Imperial Librarian to Rudolph II, whose contributions to intellectual expansion include the introduction of compulsory fines for scholars who borrowed books and failed to return them (Bolton 183-85; Lidman 27).

⁷ We are indebted to Lohr's concise but very thorough summation of Burgersdijk's career, and his scholarship is an invaluable source for anyone seeking to work on early modern Aristotelians. See also the definitive edited collection by E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop, *Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635)* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993).

⁸ Marco Sgarbi characterizes Heereboord's text as a compendium of Burgersdijk, although his intervention could be seen as greater than that implies (137).

⁹ There was also a Dutch translation of Burgersdijk's concise logic textbook, *Synopsis: Frank Burgersdijks Kort beghrijp van 't reden-konstigh onder-wijs, oft reden-konstigh ruigh be-werp* (Amsterdam: Gerrit Willemsz, 1646, repr. 1648).

¹⁰ Seminal studies include Wilbur Samuel Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700* 2nd Edition (New York, NY: Russell & Russell, 1961) and Walter J. Ong, SJ, *Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), whilst Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine provide a keystone study of the evolution of education in this time period in *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1986). For an example of a study of the role of logic in literary texts, see Sarah Knight, "Flat Dichotomists and Learned Men: Ramism in Elizabethan Drama and Satire" in *Ramus, Pedagogy, and the Liberal Arts: Ramism in Britain and the Wider World*, ed. Steven J. Reid and Emma Annette Wilson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 47-68.

¹¹ Isaac Newton, *Trinity Notebook* (1661-1664), <http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/vis/MS-ADD-03996/1>. For an illuminating discussion of Newton's encounters with Aristotelian logic like Burgersdijk's, see Dmitri Levitin, "Newton and Scholastic Philosophy," *British Journal for the History of Science*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2016), 53-77.

¹² For details of Sterne's interaction with Dutch logicians, see Kees van Strien, "Holland and the Dutch in Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*," *Notes and Queries* (2007), 71-74.

¹³ A recently photographed but not yet transcribed 1621 Frankfurt edition of Aristotle's *Aristotelis de Anima Libri Tres, Graece et Latine* contains 1794 recorded examples of marginalia. Not only is this a larger absolute number of marks and annotations than the 1568 found in *Institutionum Logicorum*, but it also represents a higher frequency of occurrence, since the Aristotle volume contains just over 400 pages, on which the same text is printed in both Latin and Greek, as compared with the slightly less than 700 monolingual pages in Burgersdijk's neo-Aristotelian treatise.

¹⁴ Their enumeration of these major sources includes "the *Autobiography* (supplemented by its Early Draft), the letter to Samuel Bentham of 30 July 1819 (when Mill was thirteen years old), outlining his studies from 1814 to 1819, and the Journal and Notebook of his sojourn in France in 1820-21, with a few amplifying and corroborating references from other sources" (CW 1:551). For the letter to Samuel Bentham, the original of which has been lost, see CW 12:6-10.

¹⁵ In his letter to Samuel Bentham, Mill only admits to having read "part of Burgersdicius," without supplying the book's title, "as far as I have gone in Aristotle" (CW 12:8). He does not specify exactly what he means by this qualification, and the continuity of marginalia throughout Burgersdijk's book suggests he read it in its entirety.

¹⁶ Images of the title page of Emerson's *Essays*, the summative comments in Tocqueville's *De la démocratie en Amérique*, and all of the pages cited below in Burgersdijk's *Institutionum Logicarum* can be accessed on *Mill Marginalia Online* (millmarginalia.org).

¹⁷ In 12.5% of cases (10 out of 80 total inter-part cross-references), the decimal tenth appears prior to the page number (i.e., 1.19). We have been able to discern no difference between the function of these inverted cross-references and those that appear in the conventional order.

¹⁸ Of the remaining ten marginal numbers, two likely form a corresponding pair (one of these has been smeared and so is unreadable),

and the remaining eight appear to be outliers with no evident cross-referencing function. Wary of archive fever, we hesitate to impose an intent upon them without stronger evidentiary ground.

¹⁹ See Sgarbi, *The Aristotelian Tradition* (137) on the connection between this formulation and the works of Italian philosopher Giacomo Zabarella. For further discussions of Burgersdijk's relationship with Zabarella, see Helen Hattab, "Hobbes's and Zabarella's Methods: A Missing Link," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2014), 461-85, 479-82.

²⁰ For a discussion of the role of printed brackets in logic texts, see Raphael Hallett, "'Reduced to Order' and 'Just for Show'? Ramus, Print, and Visual Aesthetics" in *The European Contexts of Ramism*, ed. Sarah Knight and Emma Annette Wilson (Turnhout: Brepols, 2019), 145-60; and for a discussion of the use of brackets by both Ramists and Aristotelians, see Emma Annette Wilson, "The International Nature of Britannic Ramism" in *The European Contexts of Ramism*, ed. Sarah Knight and Emma Annette Wilson (Turnhout: Brepols, 2019), 85-104.

²¹ For a fuller discussion of this, see Wilson, "International Nature of Britannic Ramism," 85-104.

²² For a fuller discussion of this logical genealogy, see Emma Annette Wilson, "The Classical Sceptical Origins of John Milton's Logic Terms," *Notes and Queries*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2013), 61-63.

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