

Margaret Fuller's Socialism

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I.

*I*n a much-cited passage of her penultimate dispatch to the *Tribune* from Italy, dated 15 November 1849, Margaret Fuller wrote, “I believed before I came to Europe in what is called Socialism, as the inevitable sequence to the tendencies and wants of the era, but I did not think these vast changes in modes of government, education and daily life, would be effected as rapidly as I now think they will, because they must. The world can no longer stand without them” (SGD 320).

What kind of a “socialist” was Fuller before she left for Europe, and what kind of socialist did she become before her early death? Recent biographers agree that she was “not a Marxist socialist”: “Her view of reality and human progress was opposite that of Marx,” writes Meg Murray: “she was fundamentally American in her insistence on the right of individuals to determine the path they take in life and on their need to accept responsibility for their actions” (351). Here is Joan von Mehren about the Fuller of 1849: “Although she was sophisticated about class conflict and realized that expectations had been unleashed that would change the future of Europe, she considered republican governments the radical political form within which mankind would realize its individual aspirations” (326). Charles Capper observes that “class questions [...] would largely remain the blind spot in Fuller’s view of the Risorgimento” (II:423). But he also cites Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s remarks on Fuller’s lost book, “which would have been ‘deeply coloured by those blood-colours of socialistic views’” (II:486), as well as Fuller’s letter to Marcus Spring of December 1849 (“I have become an enthusiastic Socialist”), and he writes that “she saw socialism as a logical

answer to [the] defeat” of Europe’s revolutions in 1848-49, while noting that Fuller, “unlike her American communitarian compatriots, [...] saw socialism as deeply entangled with politics” (II:487). As to what socialism might have meant “programmatically” for Fuller, Capper thinks it probably meant “state intervention to establish voluntary associations of production and welfare. Certainly, there was nothing revolutionary, much less proto-Marxist, about her socialism” (II:487), as she continued to view both Europe and America “through optimistic liberal democratic lenses” (II:488).

Although one is tempted to leave the matter right here, these assessments still invite questions. Where is Fuller vis-à-vis the emerging Marxist analysis? How “revolutionary” was she, and what do we mean by this term: the ends (the world turned upside down?), or the means (changing the world gradually or quickly, peacefully or through violence, by persuasion or by conflict?), or both? Although her method of analysis had been formed before she left for Europe (indeed, much of it was in place before she left for New York), Fuller’s republican radicalism, if not her optimism, increased between 1848 and 1850; despite her preference for peace, she does not exclude violence as a necessary means to achieve the goal of democratic government in Europe, and she becomes more comfortable with the concept of revolution, while not clearly distinguishing it from radical reform. While she uses the term “socialism” in her dispatches and in her letters while in Europe, she does not elaborate much on what that might mean, other than a (to her, necessary) tendency of the age. And while she uses some other terms from the socialist lexicon, such as “class,” “labor,” “the poor,” “the people,” and even “utopia,” such use appears unsystematic. What kind of a “socialist” was Margaret Fuller?

II.

Starting with Fuller’s self-labeling gives us the working premise that she was a “socialist” and allows us to ask how her views could be located, however loosely, in the historical landscape of socialism. To start with, her contemporaries Marx and Engels would put her in two categories: “conservative or bourgeois” and “utopian.”

"Conservative or bourgeois socialism," according to the *Communist Manifesto*, "is desirous of redressing social grievances in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society. To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind." This kind of socialism, say the authors, "is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois – for the benefit of the working class" (Ch. 3, 6-7). Fuller's acquaintance with such philanthropists as Marcus and Rebecca Spring, with whom she traveled to Europe in 1846, with the social reformers she met in Britain, and the republican Princess Belgiojoso in Italy certainly could put her into this category – as does her avowed desire to avoid class war and bloodshed, and to persuade her American audience that the benefits of wealth and education ought to be applied to solve the social problems of the age.

Given Fuller's interest in the theories of Fourier, she could also be labeled "critical-utopian." Among the "critical-utopian socialists" described in the *Manifesto*, Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen are mentioned by name: while offering pertinent social critiques, they fail to recognize the proletariat as a historical force: "Socialists of this kind [...] consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without the distinction of class" (12). There were certainly enough socialists among Fuller's friends and acquaintances who appealed to "society at large" and downplayed the rhetoric of class conflict – Fuller's employer Horace Greeley was one, as was Fuller's friend William Henry Channing, and Fuller herself habitually appealed to the conscience of her readers in the *Tribune* to recognize the humanity of the poor and oppressed, making social melioration a cause shared by all classes.¹

Fuller could also be categorized as a "Christian socialist." While she lacked the professional opportunities of liberal Unitarian clergymen like William Henry Channing or Theodore Parker to attempt urban social work or to use the pulpit as a forum for social advocacy, her rhetoric of social justice

and democratic progress is deeply rooted in her religious and spiritual background. From Paris, she writes on hunger in the provinces: "The doctrines of Fourier are making considerable progress, and wherever they spread the necessity of some practical application of the precepts of Christ [...] cannot fail to be felt" (SGD 119). In the same dispatch, she criticizes Fourier for his materialism: "he commits the error of making soul the result of health of body, instead of body the clothing of soul," but he was "a philanthropist in the sense of Jesus" (120). Examples abound. In her travels, Fuller seeks out such luminaries as the French Catholic socialist Lamennais, and she becomes an ally of the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, whose ascetic idealism she admires. Although her radicalism takes her beyond what both of these men advocated,² it would not be a mistake to include her in the category "Christian socialist."

Of course, Fuller's radicalism also has its sources in the transcendentalist movement, the radical potential of which has been re-emphasized in recent work. David Robinson, who calls *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* "a quintessential work of transcendentalism," notes the utopian dimension of the movement: "Idealism among the transcendentalists is [...] a means of theorizing about the possible. They connected idealism with the concept of hope and felt that the capacity to recognize the injustice of present social arrangements signified that the present was not fixed or permanent" (Robinson 2006: 278-79). Fuller's "evolution beyond the transcendentalist orbit of Boston," in particular, is "not [...] an abandonment of her intellectual legacy but a more complete realization of it" (289). This realization continues all the way to the end: her famous observation in the review of Emerson's *Essays: Second Series* that "History will inscribe his name as a father of the country, for he is the one who pleads her cause against herself" (MFC 2) is echoed numerous times in her dispatches from Rome, in which she criticizes her country for callous abandonment of principle.³

The phrase "her cause against herself" is picked up by the historian Adam-Max Tuchinsky in the title of one of three important recent essays in which he re-emphasizes the democratic potential of the transcendentalist movement and locates Fuller in what he calls "American social democratic

discourse." "The specter of Marx," says Tuchinsky, has obscured the richness and complexity of the American liberal tradition; the end of the Cold War, however, "makes it possible to reconceptualize the origins, nature, and significance of the anticapitalist Left without being bound by categories derived from Marx – or, for that matter, his critics" (Tuchinsky 2005: 471). Tuchinsky uses "the term *social democracy* to describe the expanse between Marxism and bourgeois liberalism, [...] where the *New-York Tribune* was an important participant" (462). Greeley's commitment to free labor informed his paper's "basic assumption: [...] market competition inevitably led to concentrations of power that would threaten democracy" (475). As a "committed Fourierist" through the influence of Albert Brisbane, Greeley held with his fellow associationists "that the interests of labor, capital and talent could be reconciled by fixing the rewards of work according to a more egalitarian formula" (475), but the Fourierists offered an additional hope: that alienated work would disappear entirely, as the dichotomy between mental and manual labor could be dissolved and people would only engage in work that they really loved to do. (This is a hope shared by Marx and Engels, on which more below.) While Tuchinsky takes the question of Fuller's radicalism off into a new and fruitful direction, away from the "specter of Marx," I want to leave that specter deliberately hovering here, to keep in plain view some of the affinities of Fuller's radicalism with Marx's goals, while not forgetting the difference of their methods.

That radicalism is fed by Fuller's intimate and sophisticated understanding of the Other, an understanding with roots in her personal history, her gendered identity as a woman, and her struggle to understand gender as a "social relation" (Flax 203, 212) that is not natural but historically variable. Fuller, like Marx, grew up in relatively privileged social circumstances, had a solid sense of her own patrician standing in the world, and loved luxury (when it was available) as much as he did; like Marx, she confronted poverty, experienced the difficulties of making a living as a public intellectual, and relied on the generosity of friends. As a person, however, who spent many years trying to understand what it meant to be a woman in a man's world, Fuller "experienced alienation at first hand and went on to become a

critical thinker experienced in transgressions and constraints,” her “own epistemological instability enabling her to become a diagnostician of alienation” (Fleischmann 1). Her position as a woman, and the experience of analyzing that position, enabled her to sympathize more readily with other outsiders, without losing her ability to connect with the privileged and acknowledge their perspectives as well. As a result, her analytical approach is marked by inclusiveness, an effort and ability to see the world through the eyes of others, those she pities as well as those she criticizes. That inclusiveness, in turn, is connected to her transcendentalist hope for human development, which potentially includes everyone.

Inclusiveness and mutuality are two of the main operating terms for Fuller’s cultural and political analysis. They also inform both her understanding of class, and her view of humanity’s ability to govern itself, its democratic potential, as expressed in her assessment of “the people” of New York and Italy during the last five years of her life.

III.

A “class” is a category; classification, categorization and definition are similar, if not synonymous, methods or intellectual motions. In the broadest sense, we define something either positively (by what it is) or negatively (by what it is not). The Marx and Engels method operates by *categorical exclusion* or closure; Fuller defines by explanation, expansion, translation, and opening up, by *categorical openness*. The Marx and Engels method can be seen in the *Communist Manifesto*, where an entire section, entitled “Socialist and Communist Literature,” is dedicated to shutting out other authors on the topic. Another example in the Marxist canon from this period is the *Holy Family*, written late in 1844 and published in 1845, which is an extended put-down of contemporary philosophers and social theorists. Engels’ late work entitled *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (1880) does a similar job. In these works, Marx and Engels criticize contemporary philosophers for being ahistorical, for employing concepts that remain in the realm of abstraction. But because they define by exclusion, the tidiness of their categorization is disturbed from the outset by the presence of those people

who don't fit neatly – such as the “petty bourgeoisie.” Hence, actual tidiness must be deferred to the historical future: the petty bourgeoisie, in this instance, is a class predicted to disappear. The category “class” as developed by Marx and Engels was always already in danger of becoming mechanistic and artificial (especially but not only when outside the masters' hands); when categories become rigid, dissent becomes treason, and traitors must be silenced. The history of Marxism is a history of excluding dissent, of telling the faithful what to think. An American example is the story told by Timothy Messer-Kruse of the International Workingmen's Association, which was “born in England in 1864” and expired “in America twelve years later” (1), killed by “the deep ideological chasm between a hardening Marxist orthodoxy and the republican ideals of Yankee radicals” (2). In this tale of manipulation and deceit, Marx and Engels figure as agents of party discipline and control, suspicious of all who dare to think for themselves, contemptuous not only of Americans but also of the working class everywhere: England, for instance, has a “‘sheepish’ proletariat afflicted with a ‘bourgeois infection,’” requiring others to lead them and to think for them. Here are the seeds of Leninism with its cadre theory, and of the famous dissent of Rosa Luxemburg, who insisted that “Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently.”⁴

Fuller's contrasting method can be seen in her opening up of the discussion on sex and gender in “The Great Lawsuit” and in *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*; while she creates conceptual clarity, she does not simplify. Fuller introduces gender both as a social relation and as a category of social analysis. But while she de-fines, she does not con-fine. For example: “Male and female represent the two sides of the great radical dualism. But, in fact, they are perpetually passing into one another” (161). The confining is exactly what she wants to stop, as when she writes that the present definition of womanhood comes from the authors of “little treatises, intended to mark out with precision the limits of woman's sphere, and woman's mission, to prevent other than the rightful shepherd from climbing the wall, or the flock from using any chance to go astray” (17). And not only does she accomplish this opening up of categorization through her review of women in history,

mythology, and religion, but she also tackles the difficult issue of representation that is always linked to categorization: who gets to speak for whom? In dealing with the allegation that men are “representing women fairly at present” (19), she points out that men’s views of women are defined by their personal perspectives and relations: “the sentiment will vary according to the relations in which [they are] placed. The lover, the poet, the artist are likely to view her nobly. The father and the philosopher have some chance of liberality; the man of the world, the legislator for expediency, none” (20). Women need to speak for themselves: the socialist analogy would be that the proletariat needs to speak for itself. Fuller picks up the theme when she writes from Rome (18 October 1847), “From the people themselves the help must come [...] From the aspirations of the general heart, from the teachings of conscience in individuals [...] the help must come” (*SGD* 156). Finally, in developing the categorization of gender, Fuller not only sees to it that the identities she maps out for women are never seen as complete, closed, or static, but always growing, dynamic, in flux; she also bases them on the premise of *mutuality*. In “The Great Lawsuit. Man versus Men. Woman versus Women,” Fuller had located the conflict not between men and women, but between men, women, and their potential selves; in the Preface to *Woman*, she says, “I believe that the development of the one cannot be effected without that of the other” (5).

Fuller applies this notion of mutuality as well when writing about the poor, the disabled, prison inmates, immigrants, or racial Others in New York. Looking at Fuller’s images of purity when she discusses the body politic in her New York reform writings, Jeffrey Steele finds that Fuller was confronting a widely accepted “*exclusive* model of purity” that relied on “a paradigm of social separation and cleansing” and aimed at “containment or elimination of undesirable elements.” By contrast, Fuller “began articulating an *inclusive* model of purity that folded members of many outcast groups into the body politic” (304). Rather than excluding the “impure,” Fuller “hoped to redeem it” (Steele 2006: 301, 304, 305). Steele has also examined Fuller’s rhetoric of class consciousness during the same period, which reflects “her recognition that the antebellum city and nation were composed of competing

social groups that had antagonistic needs, concerns, and ideologies" (Steele 2008: 2).⁵ Here we also find her emphasis on inclusiveness and mutuality, as in her comments on religious divisions in New York: "Challenging the doctrinal division between such groups, she anticipated a future in which different 'sects or parties' might be tolerated as varying 'schools of thought and life' and not competing theologies dividing true believers from heretics" (Steele 2008: 2). Steele rightly points out that to apply the term "class consciousness" to Fuller cannot mean either the proletariat's awareness of its own interests, or a rationalization of her own class privilege (2-3). Rather, creating a consciousness of class differences (and their "unnatural" origin as socially constructed and historically contingent) disrupts "ideological complacency" in a fashion similar to Brecht's alienation effect. It creates a sudden view of one's own perspective as contingent.

How the material circumstance of "class" shapes one's political behavior is a theme that Fuller picks up repeatedly in her dispatches from Europe. For instance, when she tries to predict whether the French will invade Rome to restore "Pio Nono," her distrust of "that people" is explained as follows: "The peasant is yet very ignorant."⁶ The suffering workman is frightened as he thinks of the punishments that ensued on the insurrections of May and June. The man of property is full of horror, at the brotherly scope of Socialism. The aristocrat dreams of the guillotine always when he hears speak of the people" (SBG 279). Class consciousness, thus understood, narrows the perspective on the world. It takes thinking outside of one's own class to see a fuller picture.

IV.

Writing from Rome on 7 May 1848, Fuller expressed great trust in the wisdom of "the people": "I hear earnest words of pure faith and love. I see deeds of brotherhood" (SGD 230). She praised the Roman masses for their patient response to the politics of Pius IX: "It was astonishing to see the clear understanding which animated the crowd as one man, and the decision with which they acted to effect their purpose. Wonderfully has this people been developed within a year!" (228). It is no less "astonishing" to see this language from the pen of a writer who only four years earlier, in *Summer on the Lakes*,

had claimed that to be “truly civilized or Christianized” is something that “cannot be expected in movements made by masses of men. The mass has never yet been humanized, though the age may develop a human thought” (*Summer* 143). Committed to individual development, Fuller found it difficult to trust political movements that required mass action. Yet somehow she seemed ready to trust just such a movement during her final year in Rome.

That Fuller idealized the Roman crowds for her American audience on purpose is evident; she sought to persuade the United States government to support the Italian democratic movement, and she needed to portray Italians as heroic freedom fighters in the mode of the American Revolution, rather than the wild-eyed rabble invoked by the London *Times* and the conservative papers in New York. But as early as the winter of 1839, her friend James Freeman Clarke commented to his sister Sarah on Fuller’s “Sphinx”-like character, noting that although Fuller had “less theoretic respect for humanity than R.W.E.,” she had “more natural affinity with the mass” (quoted from *Capper* I:314). Compared to some of her transcendentalist peers who were anxious for social reform, Fuller was then perceived as being socially conservative and skeptical about human perfectibility. “Utopia,” as she wrote in 1840, in a letter (probably) to her friend William Henry Channing, “is impossible to build up [...] I accept the limitations of human nature, and believe a wise acknowledgment of them one of the best conditions of progress” (*LMF* II:109).⁷ In the same letter, she put the relationship between individuals and society squarely on idealistic and religious grounds: “Man is not made for society, but society is made for man. No institution can be good which does not tend to improve the individual.” At the same time, she also justified an aspect of the utopian thinking she saw among the transcendentalists: “Were not man ever more sanguine than facts at the moment justify, he would remain torpid, or be sunk in sensuality. It is on this ground that I sympathize with what is called the ‘Transcendental party,’ and that I feel their aim to be the true one.” Earlier in the letter, however, she gave a more direct answer to the question why she was hesitant to jump on the social reformist bandwagon: “My position as a woman, and the many private duties which have filled my life, have prevented my thinking deeply on

several of the great subjects" that Channing and others had "at heart" (*MFL* II:109-10). While this was certainly a "consequence of her circumscribed gender status" (Capper I:314), taking such a position was also a deliberate move that Fuller used repeatedly: claiming a "liminal state" gave her not only a sharper perspective, but also the ability to see around the corner, so to speak (Fleischmann 3 *et passim*).

In the year before, in an essay on Goethe, Fuller had written, "My sympathies are with the great onward movement now obvious throughout the civilized world; my hope is that we may make a fair experiment whether men can be educated to rule themselves and communities be trusted to choose their own rulers" (Chevigny 177). A few years later, by the time she was working on *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, Fuller insisted that individual growth was contingent on external circumstances. Contrasting Fourier's emphasis on institutional changes with Goethe's call for individual self-culture, she wrote,

Fourier says, As the institutions, so the men! All follies are excusable and natural under bad institutions.

Goethe thinks, As the man, so the institutions! There is no excuse for ignorance and folly. A man can grow in any place, if he will.

Ay! But Goethe, bad institutions are prison walls and impure air that make him stupid, so that he does not will.

And thou, Fourier, do not expect to change mankind at once, or even "in three generations" by arrangement of groups and series, or flourish of trumpets for attractive industry. If these attempts are made by unready men, they will fail.

Yet we prize the theory of Fourier no less than the profound suggestion of Goethe. Both are educating the age to a clearer consciousness of what man needs, what man can be, and better life must ensue. (*Woman* 74)

But it was in New York that Fuller found her first great opportunity to test and develop this abstract insight, as she was faced with the task of writing about social outsiders. Fuller was aware that categorization must always

remain tentative, and her own efforts remain often ambiguous. In her writings, groups that are generally oppressed and maligned (such as Indians, Blacks, the Irish, the poor) tend to receive a positive re-evaluation as a *category*, even while it is acknowledged that both as a category and as individuals they may be in need of improvement. So, for instance, Fuller explains some widely assumed Irish character deficits as “the faults of an oppressed race” (she will use the same phrase to discuss the lower classes in Italy), while “Their virtues are their own” (148), and elsewhere argues against the stereotyped notion of pre-Christian peoples as primitive and ignorant (143). However, masses of people, or “the people” in general, are treated with skepticism and sometimes scorn. In a book review entitled “American Facts” (19 May 1845), Fuller points out that without understanding the principles of the country, Americans are not so different from “the coral insect through whose restless working new continents are upheaved from Ocean’s breast” (126). Elsewhere, she observes that Americans live in “a mixed state of society where, in quantity, [...] the bad preponderates, though the good, from its superior energy in quality, may finally redeem and efface its plague-spots” (359). The more commonly held views “make of the many a herd, not superior, except in the far reach of their selfish instincts, to the animals, mere calculating, money-making machines” (360). In a book review (10 January 1846) that attacks the cliché that life in the countryside is morally healthier than life in the city, Fuller warns, “Our people require a thoroughly different intellectual life, a religious aim, such as no people ever possessed before, else they must sink till they become the dregs, rather than the cream of creation, which they are too apt to flatter themselves with the fancy of being already” (334). And in a scathing essay on the “Fourth of July” (1845), she states her conviction that “The safety of the country must lie in a few [...] men” able to uphold “principles of an eternal value”: “Let men feel that in private lives, more than in public measures must the salvation of the country lie” (150), as “the multitude rushes” toward “Expediency” (151). The “multitude,” the “mass,” the “crowd,” the “public,” the “populace,” the “herd,” the “mob,” the “people at large” – all of these remain problematic terms, not least because they undermine any stable notion of “individuals” as well. From whose “private lives,” for instance, should the

salvation come? Surely not from the lives of "the so-called higher classes" (129) who are stuck on their own superiority. Over the 20 months of Fuller's New York journalism, she intensifies her criticism of the thoughtless upper classes while not abandoning a sense of social gradation; her definition of "class" focuses on intellectual and moral distinction, rather than birth rank or wealth. But salvation is also hard to expect from the poor, whose eyes, by and large, are focused on the material advantages of the New World. In her New Year's message for 1846, Fuller writes: "A large portion of our citizens, or their parents, came here for worldly advantage, and have never raised their minds to any idea of destiny or duty [...] They have received the inheritance earned by the Fathers of the Revolution, without their wisdom and virtue to use it" (328). In addition, these citizens display a democratic indifference to intellectual and prophetic voices: "The lowest Irish bog-trotter who comes here without an idea beyond that of satisfying his physical wants is as welcome on these shores as the champion of freedom, or the poet who seeks a free atmosphere that he may grow to his proper stature, and make the land a paradise with the seed of his thought. Selfishness has clouded our eyes" ("Publishers and Authors," 3 February 1846; 352).

But while pondering this dilemma, Fuller also recognizes that the very magnitude of social problems puts them beyond the capacities of even the most powerful individuals to address. In a book review published on 26 July 1845, Fuller reflects on the condition of the poor in England and wonders what advice one might give to those born to wealth and power, such as the Prince of Wales, whose position must be "one of dread" (174): "How can they enjoy one moment in peace the benefit of their possessions? And how can they give them up, and be sure it will be any benefit to others?" Individual good will or the old charitable model of "generosity" are patently insufficient to address the problems of this new era: "The causes of ill seem so deeply rooted in the public economy of England, that, if all her rich men were to sell all they have and give to the poor, it would yield but a temporary relief." What Fuller calls for instead is new thinking about these matters, "a deeper wisdom by far as to the conduct of national affairs than the world has ever yet known" (174). The

obligation of the “prince or noble,” then, is to become “a patient student, with a painfully studying world for his companion” (174). Fuller quotes from an essay by Heinrich Laube in the *Deutsche Schnellpost*, in which he describes King Oscar of Sweden as an example of “the modern kingly character,” a student “at home in the intellectual life of our time, earnest for a general culture,” a “manly democratic prince” (175). But in “this hard school-time” (174), those born to wealth and power are bound to suffer from blindness toward the general condition of humanity, due to their “sheltered position” (175). For them, leading a merely private life is a withdrawal from their obligation, as in the case of Queen Victoria, who is merely “a fashionable lady and the mother of a family” (176). Even the best-intentioned princes would only have the advantage of “a better chance to try experiments” than the many other “virtuous seekers,” but they are hardly where that needed wisdom resides. “The genius of the time is working through myriad organs, speaking through myriad mouths, but condescends chiefly to men of low estate. She is spelling a new and sublime spell; its first word we know is *brotherhood*, but that must be well pronounced and learned *by heart* before we shall hear another so clearly.” Whether it is to be found in prince or commoner, genius has no right to be worshipped but an obligation to serve: “The greatest geniuses will in this day rank themselves as the chief servants only. It is not even the most exquisite, the highest, but rather the largest and deepest experience that can serve us” (175).

The notion that wisdom and insight are to be found not among the privileged, but rather among ordinary people is elaborated in a number of places. One of them is when she celebrates the work of working-class writers, as in a review essay on “Prince’s Poems” (13 August 1845). Here she notes hopefully that “the Spirit of the Age” is “working that revolution” that “will leave behind a refreshed world, in which there may still be many low and mean men, but *no lower classes*; for it will be understood that it is the glory of man to labor, and that all kinds of Labor have their poetry, and that there is really no more a lower and higher among the world of men with their various spheres, than in the world of stars. All kinds of Labor are equally honorable, if the mind of the laborer

be only open so to understand them" (195). Intellectual pursuits have been over-rated in their potential for individual development: "certain occupations were supposed to have a better influence in liberalizing and refining the higher faculties than others. Now, the tables are turning. The inferences and impressions to be gained from the pursuits that have ranked highest are, for the present, exhausted" (195).

In a pair of essays entitled "The Rich Man – An Ideal Sketch," and "The Poor Man – An Ideal Sketch," published within six weeks of each other in February and March of 1846, Fuller tries to invoke a social harmony by imagining how members of different social classes live up to the potential and the obligations inherent in their station, but in each case the attempt ends in something like defeat.

Having problematized such terms as "upper and lower classes" elsewhere in the *Tribune* ("We must, though unwillingly, use these terms to designate the state of things as at present existing" [158]), in "The Rich Man," framed as a day dream during a walk in the City, Fuller defends social gradation, albeit on the basis of different criteria than the ones currently in existence:

Our nation is not silly in striving for an aristocracy. Humanity longs for its upper classes. But the silliness consists in making them out of clothes, equipage, and a servile imitation of foreign manners, instead of the genuine elegance and distinction that can only be produced by genuine culture. Shame upon the stupidity which, when all circumstances leave us free for the introduction of a real aristocracy, such as the world never saw, bases its pretensions on, or makes its bow to, the footman behind the coach, instead of the person within it. (361)

Fuller's rich man has a congenial family that shares his values; his workmen are well paid, and his social circle recognizes no class distinctions: "shoemakers, sempstresses and graziers mingled happily with artists and statesmen, to the benefit of both" (362).⁸ Unfortunately, the speaker's daydream of an elusive social harmony is rudely disrupted, right

at the corner of Wall Street, by the screams of “a ragged, half-starved little street sweep,” and she concludes that “the fancied cradle of the American Utopia” is “fifty years at least” in the future (366).

In “The Poor Man,” Fuller explains that while poverty is relative (even a prince may be “poor”), her remarks will be about people “somewhere between the abjectly poor and those in moderate circumstances,” “from the hodman and washerwoman up to the hard-working, poorly paid lawyer, clerk, schoolmaster or scribe” (376). For those people, poverty is no limitation: “All depends on the spirit as to the use that is made of an occupation [...]. Yes, the mind is its own place, and if it will keep that place, all doors will be opened from it” (379). In fact, the right spirit “makes Poverty the best servant to the Ideal of Human Nature” (381). If ever Fuller wrote a piece of idealistic uplift, this is it. But she will also recognize the Ideal in the poor when it matters most, as during the trying days of uncertainty in Italy, whence she writes in the summer of 1848, “In Rome there is now no anchor except the good sense of the people” (*SGD* 229).

Fortunately, in “The Poor Man” she limits her advice to those who are not at the very bottom, cautioning that the “self reliance” (376) she invokes cannot be expected from the abjectly poor: “In this stage there is no Ideal,” as its sufferers only “demand relief or death. This degree of poverty is common” – and it is everyone’s obligation “to take out at least the physical Hell from this world!” Moreover, this kind of suffering cannot be represented by those outside it: “we who do not share it have no right to address those who do from our own standard, till we have placed their feet on our own level” (376). Fuller’s reluctance at this point to constitute a constituency through representation, her open admission of the difficulty of representation (rhetorical and, by extension, political) is as remarkable as it is uncommon in the annals of socialism, in which there is generally no shortage of willingness to speak for and on behalf of “the masses.” If the political subject is rendered by the act of representation, as the philosopher Brian Seitz has argued (Seitz, Ch. V *et passim*), Fuller’s refusal to do so evinces an integrity that is in line with the many other examples in her writings where she engages in subversive acts of re-presentation.

Meanwhile, how is social improvement on a large scale to be effected? At this point, Fuller looks to several forces for effecting progress:

(1) individual transformation and moral growth;

(2) communal transformation, connected to individual growth. New immigrants, for instance, need to be taught and enlightened, so they can become "one body obedient to one soul" – "a pure soul" (18). In an article on the Irish, Fuller speaks of "mutual education" as "mutual insurance" and asks her audience to "put yourself in their places" (160) – a familiar request for empathy and imaginative identification;

(3) the spread of universal principles, especially, as Fuller writes in her 1846 New Year's overview, of "Associative and Communist principles [...] animated by faith in God and a desire for the good of Man" (328-29); a specifically American teleology, "assigned by Fate" to make the United States the "Herald of Freedom, Light and Peace to the civilized world" (328). This expectation is undimmed and undimmed by disappointment. Even after the failure of the Roman revolution, Fuller will write in Dispatch 36 that "America is the star of hope to the enclaved [sic] nations" (SGD 317).

Still, for Fuller communal or "communitarian" does not mean "collective," and the revolutionary agency she mentions most frequently is education; the most important revolutionary is the teacher, not the popular tribune. When Fuller writes a notice of a socialist publication by that title, *Der Volks-Tribun* (5 January 1846), she makes that very point. Although she professes to belong "to the 'extreme left' of the army of Progress," she takes exception to the "spirit of defiance and haste" she finds here. "Reform supposes not merely the melting to pieces by your hot desires of the old form, but that there is also a vital re-creative principle engaged, fit to organize a new form." What the country needs is "only a deep intelligence of principles, a religious devotion to them in practice, and all things would be hers" (C 235).

V.

Fuller's New York days produced a text that does acknowledge a need for revolution: her translation and endorsement of the "Letter from the Paris Correspondent of the Schnellpost" published by the *Tribune* in August 1845,

in which Marx and Engels are mentioned.⁹ The article consists of a lengthy letter by Heinrich Börnstein, the one-time editor of the Paris German-language newspaper *Vorwärts!* to which Marx contributed, becoming a co-editor in September 1844 and leading it into a much more radical direction.¹⁰ Embedded in Börnstein's letter is a letter from the carpenters of Paris to their masters, asking for higher wages. At the very end of the article, after Fuller concludes her translation of Börnstein's letter, she adds these comments: "the new era is not far off. The new era, when the laborer shall be thought worthy of his hire, and every man entitled to express the wants that consume him, and ask relief from the cares that now harass so many from the cradle to the grave" (*MFC-C* 171: 11).¹¹

Three sets of ideas are put forth in the article Fuller called "The Social Movement in Europe":

(1) The carpenters argue for a wage increase to compensate for lost purchase power, and they denounce any political intent: "we are not politicians [...] we are simply workmen; we know what we are worth." They resist the era's trend to downgrade artisan labor to a mere commodity, in line with workingmen in other countries. They indicate their willingness to consider the interests of the masters, and offer constructive collaboration: "Would it not be better if you, our Masters, instead of blackening us before the authorities as agitators, united with us to improve the situation?" (9). Pointing to the mutuality of interests, of course, is in line with Fuller's own thinking.

(2) In his comments on Socialism, "the great Idea of the Age," Börnstein puts "social revolution" ahead of political revolution: "political freedom and equality are chimeras that leave the poor poor, the hungry hungry, the ignorant ignorant, and all kinds of miseries as they were before; [...] they correct neither the faults nor vices of individuals nor the errors of the masses, nor the false relations of our present society [...]; [...] we must have grander, wider, more comprehensive principles on which to base a new order" (1-2). The same idea was current among the American disciples of Fourier: "Politics may guarantee us the Right to vote, but it cannot guarantee to the Working Classes the Right of Labor, the Right of Education, and to All, justice and encouragement," wrote Albert Brisbane, Fourier's chief propagandist, in the

New-York Weekly Tribune as early as 5 March 1842 (quoted from Tuchinsky 2005: 470).

(3) Börnstein differentiates between Communism, Socialism, and Humanism. "[T]wo classes standing at a great distance from one another" are advancing new social ideas, "the philosophers and the laborers" (5). Humanism is an ideal advocated by philosophers, while Communism is an approach developed by poor working folks: "While [advanced philosophers] are showing that the noblest thing for a human being is to be thoroughly human, while they are establishing freedom and equality in their highest sense of every man's right to free, unimpeded development of his mental and bodily powers, full unimpeded satisfaction of his natural wants and desires, come poor laborers, tailors, carpenters and the like, through their practical experience to the same results, though they clothe them in a coarser form" (3). Both Humanism and Communism, he predicts, "*will vanish* and out of them a new social religion, a new social philosophy and form arise" (3). It will bring "equality in education" and "equal human no less that [*sic*] equal political rights" (4). But Börnstein wants to keep the field open for debate: "A view which seeks for its field of vision boundless human freedom, cannot submit to be enslaved to a system" (5) What he finds unbearable about the present day is that social critics attack each other, "instead of trying to join hands" (5), and that he refuses to knock the views of others: "Let each one speak for himself – none for all. I should be as unfit to represent Weitling as Weitling¹² to take upon himself the critical atheism of Marx: Try all things and hold fast the good, remains my motto" (5). Fuller's concern with representation is echoed here, and her approval goes to Börnstein for pleading "to join hands" for a common purpose, whereas the editor of the *Volks-Tribun* is criticized for "heat and abuse": "The spirit of defiance and haste exhibited by the *Volks-Tribun* is not the spirit for Young America." How would "our warlike friend" have liked to be spoken to in the same tone? "It is not to a challenge, but an expectation of kindness and justice, that the human heart replies. Only the divine sheds its dew on all who will receive, on supplicants and challengers alike" (C 235:2). Reconciliation, harmony, not class warfare is what brings about meaningful reform.¹³

VI.

Börnstein turned up in the *Tribune* in a more significant capacity, when he became the *Tribune*'s Paris correspondent in 1848 to cover events in France. Since Fuller was unavailable, Charles Dana and Bayard Taylor were drafted as translators. In this reporting, "Börnstein covered politics as a contest of social forces" (Tuchinsky 2005: 487). Under the influence of his work, the paper moved away from its emphasis on "reconciliation of capital and labor" (488) and much closer to interpreting the struggle in France "as a social revolution" (490). Börnstein's reporting ended when Dana arrived in the city to report from France and Germany. In Cologne, "no doubt armed with an introduction from Börnstein, Dana met Marx, a meeting that in 1851 resulted in Marx's decade-long employment as European correspondent of the *Tribune*" (490).¹⁴

In his excellent rendering of the *Tribune*'s political evolution after 1848, Tuchinsky points out the increasing difficulty of sustaining the paper's "faith" in a possible "harmonization of interests": "French events forced American liberal socialists to pay new attention to power, violence, politics, and class" (491). This is the same re-orientation Fuller underwent, as a result of her experiences in Italy. In December 1846 she had still stated her hope that needed social changes in England would "be effected by peaceful revolution which shall destroy nothing except the shocking inhumanity of exclusiveness" (SGD 88); in March 1848 she was writing in a very different tone about the events in France: "it would appear that the political is being merged in the social struggle; it is well; whatever blood is to be shed, whatever altars cast down. Those tremendous problems MUST be solved, whatever be the cost!" (211). In April, she is ready to criticize her beloved Mazzini: "he aims at political emancipation; but he sees not, perhaps would deny, the bearing of some events, which even now begin to work their way. [...] I allude to that of which the cry of Communism, the systems of Fourier, &c., are but forerunners" (225). On her own, Fuller has also arrived at the conclusion that an "uncompromising revolution" (321) is inevitable.

In a more recent essay, Tuchinsky has examined and "[rejected] the notion that socialism was a substantive component" of Fuller's turn to

radicalism (Tuchinsky 2013: 101). Unlike Börnstein, whose call "for a social revolution [...] was explicit, a clarity rooted in a comprehensive worldview" (121), Fuller "never developed a detailed political economy" and, until her very last years, was drawn to socialist discourses that were "essentially liberal," whose representatives "rejected the very notion of class struggle and most of all aimed to establish friendly, fraternal feelings between the classes" (102). Consequently, Fuller's "socialism, never fully articulated, [...] did not inform the way she understood the political condition of Italy, the sources of imperialism and nationalism, or the trajectory of revolution." Seeing "little evidence that socialism shaped, in an integral way, the manner in which Fuller viewed the world" (117), Tuchinsky affirms that "socialism as she understood it was 'preventative' and served only to mitigate rather advance fundamental social conflicts" (127). And he expels her from the revolutionary socialist tradition when he concludes that her socialism "was, arguably, distinctly counterrevolutionary" (127).

VII. Utopia, Unforgettable

It is true that, in her writings that have survived, Fuller never elaborates a theory of revolution, or more than a rudimentary understanding of economics. Her *desire* for social harmony, rather than conflict, continues to coexist, even at the end of her life, with the *recognition* that conflicts are inevitable and that it will take a revolution to spread democracy in Europe and solve its social problems. But while her perspective remains idealistic, her vision is right in the mainstream of revolutionary thinking. It is time to begin recognizing this, just as scholars have begun to adjust our view of Fourier's socialism. As Carl Guarneri explains, "Fourierism [...] proposed a peaceful but total revolution. As 'utopianism,' it presented a detailed blueprint of the ideal society; as a 'critical-utopian socialism' (the full label Marx and Engels used in *The Communist Manifesto*), it based this blueprint on a sweeping, historically informed critique of contemporary social and economic developments" (Guarneri 4-5). To label a theory that advocates social harmony as "utopian" in the sense of "unrealistic" or historically ungrounded puts one at risk, as Guarneri also reminds us, of falling in step with one of two

opposing teleologies: one that predicts the triumph of capitalism, or the other that predicts its demise because of the inevitability of class conflict (Guarneri 5). Naturally, nineteenth-century socialists never thought of themselves as “utopian”; Marx and Engels introduce that as a term of opprobrium, using the commonly understood etymology of “u-topos,” the “nowhere place,” in the tradition of Thomas More. (In English usage, of course, the homophonic pun is always implied: the Greek word “eu-topos,” meaning the “good place,” can become “eutopia,” pronounced the same way in English, so the two meanings, the good place and the no-place, are aurally conflated.) The vision of social harmony as the result of reconciliation and collaboration, rather than class conflict, can be called “[e]utopian” (in the sense of “not yet but desirable and imaginable”). In that sense, transcendentalism itself is “utopian” in its open-endedness.

As is Marxism, which has remained more powerful and attractive over time in its utopian vision than its political methods. Two dimensions of Marxist thought also inhabited by the associationists and the radical transcendentalists are the wish for full human development, of which the desire to abolish alienated work (an idea held, among others, by the Brook Farmers) is an important aspect, and the desire for an abundance that will allow society to treat all persons according to their individual abilities and needs. Marx’s famous “critique of the Gotha program” of the German Social Democrats (1875) wraps up all of this almost in passing, in some of the most famous Marxist language about what a fully developed communist society would be like: “In a higher phase of communist society, after the individuals’ slavish subordination under the division of labor has disappeared, and with it the dichotomy between mental and physical work; after labor has become not just a means for life, but the foremost desire in life; after the general development of individuals has resulted in a growth of their productive power and all sources of communal wealth have begun to flow more fully – only then can [...] society write on its banner: ‘each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs!’”¹⁵

In our context, the most interesting aspect of this paragraph is that wish fulfillment is *deferred* to an indeterminate future, a “higher phase” of

development. The Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), in his three-volume book entitled *The Principle of Hope* (*Das Prinzip Hoffnung*), drafted during exile in the United States and first published in communist East Germany during the 1950s, categorizes designs for utopian societies according to their content and means, as well as their temporal or geographical remoteness from the unsatisfying reality of their authors' time and place. "Zukunftsutopien" or "utopias of the future" constitute one such category, and the (unintended) logic is that "deferred" therefore defines "utopian." Bloch sought to retrieve the concept of utopia from the Marxist doghouse while remaining in the Marxist fold himself (an all but impossible task),¹⁶ developing a philosophy called "concrete utopia." Bloch advocates a "militant optimism" in the face of an always fallible and disappointing reality, which is necessary to keep that vision of a better future alive.

This is just what Fuller does in her final dispatch from Italy (SGD 322-23). So – could we embrace the notion of Fuller as a utopian socialist, albeit with a positive spin – a term of praise, not opprobrium? Her concept of mutuality, which appears in her cultural critique as well as her social thought, adheres to the notion upheld by Socrates in Plato's *Republic* that the good is only that which is good for everyone – a non-ideological and timeless concept, certainly applicable to our time and its own crises, such as the decline of our shared environment; that a "failure of the Commons" may mean the end of human life on the planet is no longer unimaginable.

In her book *Through Other Continents: American Literature Across Deep Time*, Wai Chee Dimock imagines a conversation between Fuller and Marx on how to respond to defeat, and how to react to the disappointments of history. She cites Marx's famous passage from *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, in which he "complains about the intrusive presence of the dead" whose ghosts haunt the living, in this case the French who experience history as a nightmarish re-run: "An entire people, which had imagined that by means of a revolution it had imparted to itself an accelerated power of motion, suddenly finds itself set back into a defunct epoch" (cited in Dimock 68). "For Marx," writes Dimock, "forward-looking revolution must leave this corpse behind, spurn it, make sure its 'ghost' will never again walk about." Fuller has a

different philosophy: the actions and thoughts of history “make of us obligated hearers. We are the only creatures on this planet capable of hearing the dead; that auditory range makes us relational beyond the limits of biology. This is what it means to be ‘human’: what it means to belong to a species constituted on both sides of mortality and conversing across that dividing line. For Fuller, and pace Marx, it is that conversing – and the ghosts it brings back – that sustains the idea of ‘revolution,’ saving the events of 1848 from utter futility, a stillborn hope” (68). Dimock introduces what she calls “a postulate of fallibility: the postulate that we have always made mistakes and will always make mistakes, that these are the punctuation marks we bring to time.” A mistake “is simply a periodic occurrence, one that translates into a collective injunction for the entire species. All of us are obligated, by these mistakes, to face up to the burden [...] of a cry for repair, for mending” (Dimock 65).¹⁷ I want to suggest that the other side of such a “postulate of fallibility” is the very “principle of hope” articulated by Ernst Bloch. Fuller was militantly hopeful about the United States, whose ideals she invoked so often, and where she hoped to create a home for her family. Although, as a resolute idealist, she would on principle not agree with the “historical materialist” Bloch, she would most likely agree with the language about “coming home” with which he concludes his third volume:¹⁸ “*The real Genesis is not at the beginning but at the end*, and it can only start to commence when society and existence become radical, grasp their roots. The root of history, however, is the working, creating, transforming and revising human being. Once humanity has got a grip on itself and founded its life in real democracy without loss and alienation, something is created in the world that shines up in everyone’s childhood, a place where no one has yet been: home” (Bloch 1628; translation mine).

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Notes

¹ The best early discussion of Fuller’s “cultural translation” between classes is in Zwarg. See esp. Ch. 6.

² Mazzini’s limitation, she says, is that he only seeks political revolution (225). And in her last dispatch, Fuller attacks the Catholic church as an

ideological obstacle to democratic progress that must go as well: "The next revolution, here and elsewhere, will be radical. Not only Jesuitism must go, but the Roman Catholic religion must go. The Pope cannot even retain his spiritual power [...] every man who assumes arbitrary lordship over fellow man, must be driven out. It will be an uncompromising revolution" (321).

³ See, for instance, *SGD* 159; 165; 317. Writing about her critique of prisons and asylums, Robinson importantly notes that these were "institutions for the protection and rehabilitation of those left out of the competitive and exclusionary culture of the rapidly growing city" (285). The concern with competition was a prominent theme of the emerging labor movement in the United States, as its advocates reacted to the growing commodification of labor (Wilentz), and it was one of the main concerns of American associationists, who saw in Fourier's systems a way to replace competition with harmony (Guarneri). In Fuller's writings, the emphasis lies on exclusion (one of the consequences of competition) as a larger category: while more abstract, it allows her to address issues of political as well as economic democracy. (The radicalism of the transcendentalist movement is also an important theme in Philip Gura's recent popular history of the movement.)

⁴ From *The Russian Revolution* (1918), Ch. 6. See <http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/russian-revolution/ch06.htm>

⁵ I wish to thank Jeffrey Steele for providing me with a copy of his unpublished paper, and for permission to quote from it.

⁶ The conservative peasant vote helped to elect Louis Napoleon and suppress the democratic uprising in Paris in 1848.

⁷ In the public exchange between Horace Greeley and Henry Raymond over social reform in the fall and winter of 1846-47, the more conservative Raymond accused the associationists of naiveté about human selfishness: "While men [...] are governed or influenced by prejudice, passion, or self-seeking in any of its forms, they can not combine and carry forward such a community as that proposed" (*New-York Courier and Enquirer*, 6 January 1847. Quoted from Tuchinsky 2005, 480). Fuller's skepticism in this regard would mark her as more conservative than Greeley, but she would have agreed with Raymond's suggestion that individual improvement must

precede or go hand in hand with social reform. But she would also have agreed with the associationist assumption “that altruism was an essential *part* of human nature” (Tuchinsky 2005, 481, emphasis added).

⁸ Fuller’s essay invokes the same ideal of the virtuous merchant as Theodore Parker in his 1846 “Essay of Merchants.”

⁹ The *Deutsche Schnellpost* was a semi-weekly published in New York City, much maligned by Karl Marx for its failure to take up the cause of communism. See, for instance, his letter to Engels in http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1851/letters/51_08_08.htm. Fuller first mentioned it in the *Tribune* on 6 January 1845 with a brief note, then more extensively on 25 January. Tuchinsky (2005) discusses this paper’s relationship with the *Tribune* in some detail (486 ff.).

¹⁰ Börnstein opposed communism as an ideological straitjacket; he emigrated to the United States in 1849, where he became an editor in Missouri and active in the Republican Party (Boernstein).

¹¹ Items marked with “C” and a number refer to the CD-ROM published as part of Bean and Myerson’s edition of Fuller’s New York articles, but not included in the printed volume.

¹² Wilhelm Weitling, a tailor by trade, was an early German communist who was initially admired by Marx and Engels, but who was rejected by them in 1846; he emigrated to the US that same year (Rivinius).

¹³ The editor of the *Volks-Tribun* at the time of this publication was Hermann Kriege (1820-1850), who had been jailed several times for his political activities in Germany, had known Engels in Wuppertal and Marx in London, and had participated in discussing Weitling’s ideas. In New York since late summer of 1845, he had started the *Volks-Tribun* to support Land Reform – for which, as well as for his emotional language, he was fiercely taken to task by Marx and Engels in May of 1846 in a resolution called “Zirkular gegen Kriege” (“Circular Letter Against Kriege”), passed by a group of London communists that also included Wilhelm Weitling, the only one who voted against the resolution. Later in 1846 Weitling, now in the States, became editor of Kriege’s paper but could not stop its demise (Wesselmann).

¹⁴ See also Ledbetter's introduction to his Penguin edition of Marx's dispatches for the *Tribune*.

¹⁵ "In einer höheren Phase der kommunistischen Gesellschaft, nachdem die knechtende Unterordnung der Individuen unter die Teilung der Arbeit, damit auch der Gegensatz geistiger und körperlicher Arbeit verschwunden ist; nachdem die Arbeit nicht nur Mittel zum Leben, sondern selbst das erste Lebensbedürfnis geworden; nachdem mit der allseitigen Entwicklung der Individuen auch ihre Produktivkräfte gewachsen und alle Springquellen des genossenschaftlichen Reichtums voller fließen – erst dann kann der enge bürgerliche Rechtshorizont ganz überschritten werden und die Gesellschaft auf ihre Fahne schreiben: Jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Bedürfnissen!" *Kritik des Gothaer Programms*, Part I. Translation mine.

¹⁶ Because he criticized the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, he was forced to retire from his chair at the University of Leipzig in 1957 and left East Germany in 1961.

¹⁷ Out of this, Dimock develops a "poetics of failure" for authorship, given that "individual finitude is both a given and a goal," making authorship (and causation in general) "too large to be borne by any one person" (78).

¹⁸ "Der Mensch lebt noch überall in der Vorgeschichte, ja alles und jedes steht noch vor der Erschaffung der Welt, als einer rechten. *Die wirkliche Genesis ist nicht am Anfang, sondern am Ende*, und sie beginnt erst anzufangen, wenn Gesellschaft und Dasein radikal werden, das heisst sich an der Wurzel fassen. Die Wurzel der Geschichte aber ist der arbeitende, schaffende, die Gegebenheiten umbildende und überholende Mensch. Hat er sich erfasst und das Seine ohne Entäusserung und Entfremdung in realer Demokratie begründet, so entsteht in der Welt etwas, das allen in die Kindheit scheint und worin noch niemand war: Heimat."

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