

John Addington Symonds and the Science of Criticism

Odin Dekkers

In an essay on “The Decay of Literature” for the *Cornhill Magazine* in 1882, Leslie Stephen surveyed the criticism of his day and noted that it “has arrayed itself in some of the dignity of science” (602). To Stephen, the influence of the natural sciences had opened up many possibilities for criticism: “It can discourse of phases of development, of the social organism, of differentiation and evolution, and the spirit of the age as learnedly as ‘sociology’ itself” (602). Criticism, Stephen argued, was no longer a hapless victim to the caprices of the individual critical mind, with judgments now resting “upon a much wider induction and more minute examination of the facts” (603). However, while criticism may have benefited from an infusion of the scientific spirit, it had also, as a result, become “less delicate and less really sympathetic” (602). Nearly fifteen years later, George Saintsbury, in his own stocktaking of contemporary criticism, reached much the same conclusion, although he did not hesitate to voice it in much stronger terms. In the “Introduction” to his *Essays in English Literature 1780-1860* of 1896, Saintsbury found at one extreme end of the critical spectrum a tendency for criticism to limit itself “to the saying of fine things,” while at the other he identified “the notion, now warmly championed by some younger critics both at home and abroad, that criticism must be of all things ‘scientific’” (xi). It was this latter notion in particular that Saintsbury took issue with, arguing that there was, first, no consensus as to what “scientific” might mean in this context, and, second, that “scientific criticism of literature must always

be a contradiction in terms” (xiii). Showing himself an unashamed aesthete, Saintsbury argued that art and literature and the criticism thereof were primarily concerned with beauty, and that beauty and science were mutually exclusive: “With beauty science has absolutely nothing to do” (xiv).

One of the critics Saintsbury – who does not mention any specific names – may well have had in mind was John Addington Symonds, one of the most scientifically minded authors of the late nineteenth century. Much of Symonds’ work was inspired by a profound, but never unequivocal, belief in the promise science held to criticism. His biographer Phyllis Grosskurth, in fact, has called his monumental *Renaissance in Italy* a “testament to Symonds’s faith in science” (*Biography* 249). To a reader who makes his first acquaintance with Symonds through his *Memoirs*, this might come as somewhat of a surprise. In the chapter on his “Intellectual and Literary Evolution,” Symonds is quite explicit about his inability to come to terms with the exact sciences:

I cannot learn anything systematically. Grammar, logic, political economy, the exact sciences offered insuperable obstacles to my mind. The result is that I know nothing thoroughly. And I do not think this is so much due to laziness as to cerebral incapacity. My brain was always impenetrable to abstractions. When I attacked them, I felt a dull resistance, a sense of benumbed and benumbing stupor stealing like a fog over my intellect. I have had to circumvent abstractions, to present them in the concrete, and to return upon them by the path of metaphor or symbol, before I was able to approach them in the form of pure thought. (Grosskurth, *Memoirs* 216)

In the little volume Frederic Harrison dedicated to Symonds in 1896, the author observes that one of the most remarkable, as well as unfortunate, aspects of the *Renaissance in Italy* is the fact that

throughout the seven volumes of this work, Symonds almost completely refrains from mentioning the revival of classical science, and the fact that Italy, in so many different fields, prepared the way for modern scientific developments (15). Symonds, for instance, as Harrison notes, fails to give Leonardo da Vinci his due as a man of science, just as he omits to devote a proper chapter to Galileo (16). The implicit and justifiable conclusion Harrison draws, is that Symonds lacked a genuine interest in and knowledge of science *per se*, both historically and in terms of the latest developments.

How far, then, did Symonds genuinely believe science could make a contribution to solving problems criticism was struggling with at the time, such as the question whether criticism should essentially be a matter of objective scrutiny or individual judgment, and, if the latter, exactly how the validity of such judgment was to be ensured? Symonds had an almost unbounded belief in, as he called it, the "hypothesis of evolution," which he saw as the culmination of the "long process of experimental and philosophical labour" that led to the scientific revolution of his own age ("Philosophy" 1). In his *Memoirs*, he describes how, about the time he made the momentous discovery of the work of Walt Whitman, he also began to study the evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer, and came to see them as a means to reconciling the findings of science with his deepest and most personal religious experience, so that "I could spin my own cocoon with more of congruence to my particular temperament than I discerned in other believers, misbelievers, passionate believers, of the ancient and the modern schools" (247). Whitman and Darwin combined, in fact, taught Symonds "what it really is to be a member of the universe I sought to worship" (247), and it was his profound conviction that an understanding of evolutionary processes could throw light on every aspect of the universe, including art, he so much desired to be at one with. It is in the fifth volume of *Renaissance in Italy*, in the midst of a discussion of the Bolognese painters of the sixteenth century, that Symonds voices this conviction explicitly for the first time:

All things with which we are acquainted are in evolutionary process. Everything belonging to human nature is in a state of organic transition – passing through necessary phases of birth, growth, decline, and death. Art, in any of its specific manifestations – Italian painting for example – avoids this law of organic evolutions, arrests development at the fairest season of growth, averts the decadence which ends in death, no more than does an oak. (*Renaissance* 5:371)

By adopting an evolutionary perspective, by encouraging “the habit of scientific tolerance” (*Renaissance* 5:372), and by accepting the inevitability of change, the critic would be able to place a work of art in relation to the overall stage of evolution of a particular period. Criticism would, for instance, no longer be concerned with “mourning over the decline of Gothic architecture into Perpendicular aridity and flamboyant feebleness” (*Renaissance* 5:372) by accepting that art, like all other aspects of nature, follows an “inevitable progression from the embryo, through ascending stages of growth to maturity, and from maturity by declining stages to decrepitude and dissolution” (“Evolutionary Principles” 30).

Symonds later used his interlude on criticism along evolutionary lines from the fifth volume of his *Renaissance in Italy* as the opening section for his essay “On Some Principles of Criticism,” one of the seventeen essays that make up his *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*, published in 1890. He had high hopes for this collection, claiming in a letter to his friend Horatio Brown that he was “interested in this book more than I have been in any other” (Brown 452). He felt strongly that, more than any other book he had published, this volume represented who he was and what he stood for, regarding it, in the words of Van Wyck Brooks, as “the fruit of a long and conscious self-discipline towards wisdom, during which he had ruthlessly cut away personal ambition and liberated himself from the bondage of words” (Brooks 193-94). Not surprisingly, therefore, the *Athenaeum* reviewer’s

conclusion that "Mr. Symonds's reputation would have stood as high, if not higher, if this book had never appeared" (Rev. *Essays Speculative* 279) came to him as a severe blow, which "blights any pleasure one may have had in one's work" (Brown 454). On the whole, however, the critical response was not as negative as Symonds initially perceived it to be. In the American journal *Poet Lore*, critic Helen A. Clarke announced that "a more wise and beautiful essay than that on 'Some Principles of Criticism' could not be imagined," and praised Symonds for being "a true prophet when he is dealing with the principles upon which criticism should be based" (601).

Although Symonds by no means saw himself as a "prophet," he did feel that, now more than ever, there was a need for critical guidance based on sound, evolutionary principles. He observed that "During the last half-century, taste has been more capricious, revolutionary, and apparently anarchical than at any previous age" ("Principles" 53-54). Symonds did not, however, believe that the state of radical disorder he perceived criticism to be in was necessarily a negative development. At least, criticism now displayed a healthy disrespect toward ancient dogma and "the idols of past generations" (53). Moreover, he professed his belief that pioneers in the field of criticism should be allowed the occasional *faux pas*, since no revolution in taste could be effected "without some injustice to ideals of the past and without some ill-grounded enthusiasm for the ideals of the moment" (55). All the same, he argued, criticism at this point in time was in dire need of reflection on its first principles.

Whereas Symonds was prepared to see the apparent state of anarchy in criticism as not wholly negative – at least anarchy entailed rejuvenation – other critics were much more vocal in emphasizing the dangers of critical chaos, especially given the explosive growth in literary production in response to the rapid expansion of the reading public. In an article for the *Nineteenth Century* of September 1889, William Knight discusses the problems contemporary critics were faced with in detail:

The multiplication of books, however, even of great books on great subjects, is becoming a serious element in the literature of the nineteenth century. Although it dooms the vast majority to speedy extinction, it is bewildering to those who have to deal with them critically. It is quite impossible for a student – and much more impossible for the general reader – to master those that issue annually from the British press, even in a single department; and there is no reason to expect less activity in the printing-presses of the future. They will probably work more busily than ever, as the number of those who write books is at least double that of those who used to write in the last generation. (429)

The critic, Knight argues, who finds himself faced with a deluge of new material that needs urgent reviewing will have to think carefully about his own position and principles if he wants to be a fair judge. Novelist and critic Grant Allen showed himself similarly concerned about the quality of contemporary reviewing, pointing out the restrictive conditions critics were forced to work in: limited space, the requirement to fill that space mostly with summaries rather than reasoned criticism, the need to write for as wide an audience as possible. Under those circumstances, Allen noted, it was hardly surprising that critical standards were dropping, and that “only the professional reviewer has any conception of the depths of human inanity that are poured daily out of the British printing press” (348). Fellow critic Henry James was, in fact, even more outspoken in his views on the same topic:

The vulgarity, the crudity, the stupidity which this cherished combination of the offhand review and of our wonderful system of publicity have put into circulation on so vast a scale may be represented [...] as an unprecedented invention for darkening counsel. The bewildered spirit may ask itself, without speedy

answer, What is the function in the life of man of such a reverberation of platitude and servitude. (399)

What all three critics argue for here, is a form of criticism that judges literature – whether the literature of the past or the present – on the basis of genuine expertise and authority on the part of the critic. In their view, passing judgment on literature, on works of art in general, was indeed the critic's primary function. One of the most outspoken detractors of this view was the American novelist and critic William Dean Howells, whose influential essay "Criticism and Fiction" – primarily a defence of realism in fiction – opens with an indictment of the primacy of value judgment in criticism:

It is still his [i.e. the critic's] conception of his office that he should assail with obloquy those who differ with him in matters of taste and opinion; that he must be rude with those he does not like, and that he ought to do them violence as a proof of his superiority. It is too largely his superstition that because he likes a thing it is good, and because he dislikes a thing it is bad; the reverse is quite possibly the case but he is indefinitely far from knowing that in matters of taste his personal preference enters very little. (20)

Why, Howells asks himself here, should criticism be a matter of private opinion as a matter of course? Would it not be much more plausible to limit oneself to knowable facts, making it the critic's job "to ascertain facts and traits of literature, not to invent or denounce them; to report, not to create" (23)? Howells here proposes a type of critic who is an objective observer and classifier, much like a botanist, a natural historian who "classifies the objects of his study, rather than to praise or blame them" (20).

The image of the "critic as botanist" and natural historian that Howells employs here is a familiar one, and recalls the work of the French philosopher and historian Hippolyte Taine, who, in his *Philosophy of Art*, posited that criticism was to be "analogous to

botany, which studies the orange, the laurel, the pine, and the birch, with equal interest” (38). In Taine’s view, literature was simply one of the many products of human endeavour, “of which one must point out the characteristics and seek the causes – nothing more” (37). Likewise, the critic Richard G. Moulton, another advocate of non-judicial criticism, had drawn on the analogy with botany to prescribe the critic’s function in his book on *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist*: “As botany deals exclusively with the phenomena of vegetable life and traces the laws underlying them, as economy reviews and systematises on inductive principles the facts of commerce, so there is a criticism not less inductive which has for its subject-matter literature” (2). It seems unlikely, though, that Howells was aware of the relatively obscure Moulton, just as it seems probable that he was aware of Taine’s work, which was widely discussed in the British and American press. What is an absolute certainty, however, is that he had read the fifth volume of Symonds’s *Renaissance in Italy*, in particular the pages on the nature of criticism, since he quotes from these extensively, and with approval, in the opening sections of his essay.

Whether Symonds, in his turn, ever read Howells’ essay remains unclear, but if he had, he would have had some difficulty placing the American critic within his own tripartite classification of critics. In “On Some Principles of Criticism,” Symonds argues that there are basically three types of critics. The first is the critic as “judge,” the second defines the critic as “showman,” and the third type is that of the “scientific” critic. Until recently, Symonds contends, there was no question as to the critic’s primary function, which was, following the Greek etymology of the term, that of one “who pronounces judgment upon the work of others” (59). In this view of criticism, taste is determined by authority, and the pre-eminent critic is the one who lays down the law to others. The second type of critic – a recent development in the evolution of criticism – claims no such authority, but is “content with studying and displaying the qualities of things submitted to his intellect and senses” (60). Here, we encounter once

again the familiar trope of the critic as botanist, as one who classifies and describes, "as a botanist the plants with which he has to do" (60). In this case, the critic adopts what is very much a subordinate position in relation to the work of art under scrutiny. It is in this category that one might perhaps expect to encounter Taine and Howells, if it weren't for the surprising fact that, historically, Symonds places the "critic as showman" in the Romantic period. He does not provide any examples of critics who may be pigeonholed as "showmen," so that the category remains somewhat hazily defined. The third category, finally, is that of the scientific critic, who "arrives at conclusions after preparatory studies in history, psychology, scholarship, by means of which he hopes to ground his judgment on sufficient demonstration" (61). Unlike Howells, however, Symonds' scientific critic does not lay any claims to being objective. Like all critics, he judges, but "not without understanding the natural and historical conditions of the product under examination, and without making the allowances demanded by his sense of relativity" (61). The scientific critic, it would appear, is ultimately closest to Symonds' ideal type.

Yet Symonds stops short of fully embracing scientific criticism. The true critic, he concludes, "must combine all three types in himself, and hold the balance by his sense of reciprocal relations" (62). It is at this point that Symonds' ambivalent attitude toward science fully reveals itself. What he finds lacking from science is essentially the human, the individual element. In his essay on "The Philosophy of Evolution," Symonds praises Taine for being "the first to apply natural physiological principles to the study of what is understood as culture" and for adopting a method which "drew attention to the *milieu*, the ethnological conditions, the climatic and social environments, which modify each particular product of human genius in art and literature" (7). So far, Taine may have been moving in the right direction, but, significantly, "there remained something stiff and formal, a something inconsistent with the subtlety of Nature, in his philosophy of culture" (7). Symonds is looking here for a way to allow more scope for the

individual to develop against the grain of his environment, just as he himself had had to struggle throughout his life to assert his individuality in the face of the moral rules of the society in which he moved. Taine's theory appeared to offer the idiosyncratic individual no chance to escape from the outward pressures of *race*, *milieu* and *moment*, thereby – at least in theory – reducing the individual artist to an object of little interest to the critic. It was, however, precisely the individual artist that Symonds was intensely interested in.

In Symonds' view, the theory of evolution as expressed by Darwin and Spencer did offer the critic the opportunity to study the individual within the context of a unifying scientific theory. In "The Philosophy of Evolution," Symonds explains how for him, and many of his generation, evolution appeared to offer a way for criticism to do away with the primacy of personal taste by viewing the history of art and literature through a single theoretical lens, while at the same time not giving way to an arid form of generalizing, logic-chopping scientism that left no room for the imagination:

We felt that here was a right way towards living and thinking in the whole. The steady determination to regard all subjects of inquiry from the point of view of development delivered criticism from the caprice of connoisseurship and the whims of dilettantism. It superseded the attractive but often vaporous generalisations of the logician by a sound method of analysis. It lent the charm of biography or narrative to what had previously seemed too dull and lifeless – the history of art or letters. (7)

Symonds' unexpected use of the word "charm" in this context clearly indicates how crucial it was for him to allow individual experience to color the critical historiography of art and literature. Evolutionary theory offered him a means to make full allowance for the personal and individual within a framework that promised "the right way toward living and thinking in the whole" (7). His interest in the finer points of

evolutionary theory, in evolution as a *scientific* theory, appears to have been very limited, and he does not, for instance, distinguish between the ideas of Darwin and Spencer at all, nor does he discuss them in any detail anywhere in his work. Paradoxically, therefore, evolution appears at times to have been for him almost an *antidote* to science, a way of making science more human.

In "On Some Principles of Criticism," Symonds emphasizes that science alone can never provide the educational background needed by the critic who knows how "to temper his subjectivity by the study of things in their historical connections" (62). Although Symonds was no follower of Arnold,¹ there is an unmistakable Arnoldian ring to his description of the true critic as requiring "a notion of what has been thought and wrought by our race in its totality, of what humanity at its best and strongest has achieved by uninterrupted yet continuous effort" (63). To achieve such a notion, only a proper grounding in "history and literature and art and law" (63) will suffice; a training in mathematics and the natural sciences alone will leave the student – and the critic he may later become – devoid of a proper sense of mankind's moral and mental achievements.

Symonds' ambiguous attitude toward science, which appears to attract him as much as it repels him, invites the question whether he genuinely believed criticism could ever become a science. In his essay on "Victorian Evolutionary Criticism," John Holmes discusses a number of Victorian critics who grappled with this question, particularly in relation to the role of evolutionary principles in critical theory. In addition to Taine's model of the literary critic as natural historian and Symonds' own experiments in scientific criticism, Holmes identifies two major strands in Victorian evolutionary criticism: "The first is Spencer's project of interpreting the evolution of the arts in the light of comprehensive evolutionary principles. The second is the theory of physiological aesthetics, built up by Grant Allen and Constance Naden on foundations laid again by Spencer" (102). Holmes references H.M. Posnett and Edmund Gosse as following in the

footsteps of, in particular, Spencer and Taine; another important name in this connection is that of E.S. Dallas, whose *The Gay Science* (1866) was an ambitious attempt to show how criticism “can be raised to the dignity of a science” (Dallas v). In France, the most comprehensive endeavor to establish a science of criticism was made by the young critic Émile Hennequin in his *La Critique Scientifique* of 1888, which received some little attention in the British press, notably from Edward Dowden.

Symonds, however, makes no mention of either Dallas or Hennequin, and approaches the question as if he were the first to raise it. It does not take him long to conclude that a science of criticism is an impossibility, mainly due to the element of subjective judgment, which he sees as an essential component of all criticism: “It is also clear that criticism, implying as it does judgment, cannot be classed with such a science as geology, which does not pretend to judge, but catalogues, maps out, and attempts to trace the evolution of the material substances composing the earth’s crust” (“Principles” 64). Symonds briefly entertains the idea that criticism might become a science in the way that Ethics and Political Economy are labelled as such, but then dismisses it, arguing that criticism can never be “a department of systematised knowledge,” but is, in fact, “an instrument or organ ancillary to all sciences and to every branch of investigation which implies the exercise of judgment” (65). If criticism, then, cannot be said to be a science, can it at least be exercised “in a scientific spirit, with a defined method, with principles established rationally and applied logically” (65)?

In answering this question, Symonds once again shows himself highly ambivalent in his attitude toward the potential for science to offer a new impetus to criticism, and once again it is the problem of subjective judgement that appears to engender this ambivalence. Symonds initially seems to adopt a sympathetic stance toward the idea of basing criticism on scientifically established method or methods. He sets out to list, in a more or less systematic fashion, the criteria the

scientifically motivated critic should meet. First of all, he must come to his task in possession of "views regarding art in general, and the functions of the several arts" as well as of "conceptions of what is meant by the abstract terms he uses" (65). The critic, in other words, should pursue his inquiries armed with the proper instruments and the knowledge of how to use them. Second, and more importantly, the critic "should be familiar with the main literatures and art-epochs of the past" (66). If the critic does not have a proper grasp of the facts, he will not be able to reach conclusions on the basis of inductive reasoning, "the leading philosophical impulse of our age" (66). Third, the critic must possess "a certain amount of technical skill" (66), a basic understanding of the technicalities that are instrumental to artistic creation. Thus equipped, the critic as Symonds sees him would appear to be ready to accept the tasks of delivering methodologically sound verdicts. However, as soon as the individual critic confronts the work of the individual artist, the "unavoidable subjective element" obtrudes on the critic's ability to proceed with any definite degree of scientific rigor: "His final utterance or verdict is a summing up of the impressions made upon him by the work subjected to his sensibility and analytic reason. His experience of life, his susceptibility to beauty, his knowledge of history, his insight into character, his powers of observation, his technical acquirements, are brought into play at every moment by the work of art before him" (67). Due to its inherent subjectivity, Symonds concludes with apparent finality that criticism can never in any exact sense of the word become truly scientific.

However, the lure of science does not allow Symonds to leave things just there. Having established the limits subjectivity imposes on founding criticism on scientific principles, he changes tack, and argues that it is precisely in the *awareness* of these limits that criticism may, after all, hope to claim some degree of scientific status: "To this extent, then, through the perception of what criticism ought to be, through the definition of its province, and through the recognition of what is inevitably imperfect in its instrument, the method tends to being in its

own way scientific” (72). Criticism, in other words, can only ever hope to be placed on a scientific footing if it becomes aware of the inherent impossibility of this ever happening. On this paradoxical note, Symonds finally leaves the topic of scientific criticism behind, and moves on to a far less contentious description of the one quality the ideal critic is supposed to possess. The making of the true and wise critic, he contends, is in the possession of plain and simple common sense, “implying knowledge of human nature, prudence, shrewdness, the power of weighing evidence” (77).

This perhaps somewhat pedestrian conclusion to “On the Principles of Criticism,” along with some of the paradoxes inherent to the essay, might appear to reveal Symonds as ultimately a moralist of a familiar Victorian type, to whom the sympathetic appreciation of art was the real and uncontested goal of criticism. Indeed, in his biographical study of Symonds, Van Wyck Brooks suggests that his loose and ambivalent use of scientific and evolutionary concepts was due to two causes: “first, that he approaches the problem rather imaginatively than in the spirit of exact science, and secondly that his data are historical and aesthetic rather than biological or geological” (218-19). By his own admission, Symonds lacked any real scientific impulse, strongly resisting what he perceived as the lack of the human and moral element in science. At the same time, he felt powerfully drawn to science and particularly to the concept of evolution because they seemed to offer to him, the perennial outsider, a way to achieve a sense of being at one with history and the universe, a way to, as his motto ran, “live resolvedly in the Whole, the Good, the Beautiful” (*Memoirs* 247).

However, to categorize Symonds primarily as a conventional moralist would be to downplay both the subtlety and complexity of his ideas on evolutionary criticism in relation to culture and the significance of his critical work in the light of recent debates on the relation between literature and science. In his study *Colonies, Cults and Evolutions*, David Amigoni has drawn attention to Symonds’ use

of the image of culture "as a 'magic robe' woven between the arts and sciences" and how it may act as an incentive for cultural analysis to "explore the wider patterns of exchange, discursive movement, and contestation that have shaped the literary and scientific interfaces of the past and present" (189). In his turn, Holmes emphasizes the importance of an awareness of Symonds as a precursor to the current debate on literary Darwinism. In a recent article, Jonathan Kramnick defines literary Darwinism as an increasingly institutionalized critical movement predicated on the belief "that the humanities have fallen into disrepute because our assumptions fly in the face of accepted science, especially the science of mind," pointing out how "Arguably no movement in literary studies has attracted so much attention in quite some time. Literary Darwinism would seem to be all the rage" (316). Holmes identifies the biologist Edward O. Wilson, author of *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (1998), as the founding father of the school – also referred to as biopoetics – which is nowadays further associated with such names as Brian Boyd, Joseph Carroll, Denis Dutton, Jonathan Gottschall, and Frederick Turner (101). Literary Darwinists such as these, Holmes argues, do not pay sufficient heed to the history of their own discipline, leaving a voice such as Symonds' mostly unheard and neglecting the opportunities his criticism offers for finding a productive model of consilience between (evolutionary) science and literature. Like Wilson, Symonds aims to establish a consilience of science and literary criticism, but whereas contemporary literary Darwinists argue that literary criticism can only be saved by establishing a new paradigm on iron-clad scientific premises, Symonds adopts a more fruitful relativist position, advancing "a pluralist model of criticism that has space for such scientific approaches within it but does not preclude other lines of enquiry" (111). It is precisely, Holmes argues, because Symonds stops short of offering a full-fledged model of scientific criticism and "calls instead for a shared commitment to empiricism" that his work on science, evolution and criticism in particular should continue to be

studied (112). Whether or not one shares Holmes' position, it is clear that Symonds' work continues to warrant sustained critical attention, possibly even, in the light of the debate on literary Darwinism, now more so than ever.

Radboud University, Nijmegen

Note

¹ See Symonds' challenge to Arnold in his essay, "Is Poetry at Bottom a Criticism of Life?" in *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*.

Works Cited

- Allen, Grant. "The Decay of Criticism." *Fortnightly Review* 31 (1882): 338-51.
- Amigoni, David. *Colonies, Cults and Evolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Brooks, Van Wyck. *John Addington Symonds. A Biographical Study*. New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914.
- Brown, Horatio F. *John Addington Symonds. A Biography*. London: Smith, Elder, 1903.
- Clarke, Helen A. "The New Criticism." *Poet Lore* 2 (1890): 598-601.
- Dallas, E.S. *The Gay Science*. Two Volumes. London: Chapman and Hall, 1866.
- Dowden, Edward. "Literary Criticism in France." *Fortnightly Review* n.s. 46 (1889): 737-53.
- Rev. of *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*. *Athenaeum* 3279 (30 August 1890): 279-80.
- Grosskurth, Phyllis. *John Addington Symonds. A Biography*. London: Longmans, 1964.
- , ed. *The Memoirs of John Addington Symonds*. London: Hutchinson, 1984.
- Harrison, Frederic. *John Addington Symonds*. New York: Macmillan, 1896.

- Hennequin, Émile. *La Critique Scientifique*. Paris: Perrin, 1888.
- Holmes, John. "Victorian Evolutionary Criticism and the Pitfalls of Consilience." *The Evolution of Literature. Legacies of Darwin in European Cultures*. Ed. Nicholas Saul and Simon James. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011. 101-112.
- Howells, W.D. "Criticism and Fiction." *Criticism and Fiction and Other Essays*. Ed. Clara Marburg Kirk and Rudolf Kirk. New York: New York University Press, 1959. 9-69.
- James, Henry. "The Science of Criticism I." *New Review* 4 (1891): 398-402.
- Knight, William. "Criticism as Trade." *Nineteenth Century* 26 (1889): 423-30.
- Kramnick, Jonathan. "Against Literary Darwinism." *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): 315-47.
- Moulton, Richard G. *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist. A Popular Illustration of the Principles of Scientific Criticism*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893.
- Saintsbury, George. "Introduction: The Kinds of Criticism." *Essays in English Literature 1780-1860*. London: Rivington, Percival, 1896. ix-xxix.
- Stephen, Leslie. "The Decay of Literature." *Cornhill Magazine* 46 (1882): 602-12.
- Symonds, John Addington. "On the Application of Evolutionary Principles to Art and Literature." *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*. 3rd ed. London: Smith, Elder, 1907. 27-52.
- . "Is Poetry at Bottom a Criticism of Life?" *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*. 3rd ed. London: Smith, Elder, 1907. 315-34.
- . "The Philosophy of Evolution." *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*. 3rd ed. London: Smith, Elder, 1907. 1-26.
- . *Renaissance in Italy. Vol. 5. The Catholic Reaction. In Two Parts*. Vol. 2. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1887.
- . "On Some Principles of Criticism." *Essays Speculative and Suggestive*. 3rd ed. London: Smith, Elder, 1907. 53-78.

Taine, Hippolyte. *The Philosophy of Art*. Trans. John Durand. 2nd rev. edition. New York: Holt & Williams, 1873.

Wilson, Edward O. *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*. New York: Knopf, 1998.

